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Two studies extended previous research on Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) by examining the extent to which political ideology moderates the 
psychological reactions to various types of moral dilemmas. In Study 1, participants 
responded to moral dilemmas that asked them to trade-off between moral foundations 
related to individual rights (individualizing) and/or foundations related to social order and 
the restriction of behavior (binding). For trade-offs crossing individualizing with binding 
foundations, conservatives were more likely than liberals to experience negative affect, 
arousal, and difficulty making a decision while contemplating these trade-offs. Also, 
liberals were more likely than conservatives to clearly prefer the individualizing option. 
Study 2 tested whether affirming one’s endorsement of individualizing or binding 
foundations could alleviate the threat induced by contemplating trade-offs between two 
moral values. Some participants were given the opportunity to credential themselves on 
either individualizing or binding foundations and then responded to individualizing 
versus binding trade-offs. The manipulation had no consistent effect of any of the 
dependent variables. Although the hypotheses for Study 2 were not supported, both 
studies suggest that association between political ideology and moral foundations extend 
to complex and realistic dilemmas and might be driven by cultural conservatism or 







When Moral Foundations Collide: An Examination of Liberals’ and Conservatives’ 
Reactions to Cross-Foundational Moral Trade-offs 
 If asked, few people would be likely to disagree that it is morally wrong to deny 
treatment to people who are gravely ill, yet a substantial proportion of Americans were 
opposed to a health care reform package passed by the U.S. congress in March of 2010. 
One of the more common objections to the legislation was the concern that it would 
cover illegal immigrants, which was memorably expressed by Congressman Joe Wilson 
(R-SC) by shouting, “You lie!” in the middle of a presidential address to Congress in 
2009. Likewise, many people would concur that equal rights for American citizens is a 
moral imperative. However, a proposition to amend the California state constitution to 
restrict marriage to heterosexual unions passed with a slight majority in 2008. 
 Although these two events are not directly related to each other, they both 
demonstrate the importance morality plays in political discourse and the strong 
emotions that often accompany disagreements. For supporters of health care reform and 
same-sex marriage, opponents were seen as selfish, bigoted individuals who are 
antithetical to America’s egalitarian ideals, whereas those same opponents saw 
supporters as godless, socialist liberals who want to subvert American values by 
redistributing wealth from honest, hard-working individuals to the lazy and shiftless and 
destroying the sacred institution of marriage. Each side sees itself on the right side of 
the moral equation, while simultaneously demonizing the opposition. 
 Of course, the more rancorous reactions are relegated to those on the extremes 
of the political spectrum. However, the underlying lack of understanding of the other 
side of the isle is somewhat more pervasive. In an effort to explain why some 
individuals who differ in political ideology seem incapable of understanding the other’s 
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viewpoint to the point where the opposition is viewed as lacking in morals, Haidt and 
colleagues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt, Graham, & 
Joseph, 2009; Haidt & Jospeh, 2008; Joseph, Graham, & Haidt, 2009) theorized that 
this is a result of very different definitions of what morality actually is between persons 
of different political persuasions. Specifically, research on Moral Foundations Theory 
(MFT) suggests that there are at least five basic foundations from which people can 
define their morality, and the relative weights given to the five foundations can roughly 
correspond to value differences across the political spectrum. The purpose of the 
following studies was to test several motivational and affective implications of MFT by 
exploring how both liberals and conservatives react when considering trade-offs across 
moral foundations instead of the foundations in isolation. Before I describe MFT in 
more detail, however, I will first briefly review the literature on the broader 
psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. 
The Psychology of Political Ideology 
 Perhaps because of the tendency for academicians to be on the liberal side of the 
political spectrum, most psychological research on ideology has focused on 
conservatism, with liberalism only examined as relative to conservatism. Early research 
on political ideology considered ideology as attitudinal clusters or belief systems 
(Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960). More recent models of conservatism generally concur 
that a conservative ideology is a product of various individual traits, personal 
experiences, and/or cognitive-motivational goals (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Tetlock, 1986). Although the specifics of the different 
models may differ, they are similar in their recognition of right-wing authoritarianism 
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(RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) as major components of conservative 
ideology. Before I describe these general models more specifically, I will first briefly 
review the relevance of both RWA and SDO to conservative ideology. 
 Authoritarianism. Like many lines of research in social psychology, the study 
of political ideology arose from the desire to explain how an entire nation can be 
culpable for the genocide of over six million individuals during World War II. In their 
landmark publication, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) 
proposed a personality trait they labeled authoritarianism to explain how some 
individuals seem predisposed towards prejudice. They defined authoritarianism as “a 
general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and to remain uncritical toward 
authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures 
in the name of some moral authority” (p. 228). Adorno et al. also identified nine 
separate components of authoritarianism: conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, 
authoritarian submission, anti-intraception (i.e., disdainful of the notion of subjectivity), 
superstition and stereotypy, power, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and a 
concern with the sexual matters of others. 
 Partly because of its presumption that authoritarianism was solely a 
phenomenon of the right wing of politics (the scale that measured it, after all, was called 
the F, or Fascism, Scale, with fascism being a right-wing ideology), Adorno et al.’s 
(1950) early conceptualization of authoritarianism encountered some early criticism. 
Rather than viewing political ideology as unidimensional with authorianism on the 
right, Eysenck (1954, 1956) asserted two dimensions: tough-mindedness versus tender-
mindedness and conservatism versus radicalism. Consistent with the classic definition 
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of authoritarianism, tough-mindedness is associated with aggression, dominance, 
intolerance of ambiguity, and rigidity (Eysenck, 1954). Thus, authoritarianism was not a 
defining feature of the right, but a feature of any ideological belief system that is 
typified by tough-mindedness (e.g., Fascism on the right and Communism on the left). 
A similar criticism was levied by Rokeach (1960), who believed that authoritarianism 
was a symptom of a dogmatic, or closed, ideological belief system. Like Eysenck 
(1954, 1956), Rokeach (1960) argued that political ideology was a function of both 
content (left or right) and structure (open or closed). Any closed belief system, whether 
it is leftist or rightist, would fall under the definition of “general authoritarianism.” 
Despite these claims, however, authentic left-wing authoritarians have proven difficult 
to find empirically (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Stone, 1980; but see McClosky & Chong, 
1985; van Hiel, Duriez, & Kossowska, 2006, for evidence of left-wing authoritarianism 
in extreme groups). 
 Despite these objections, the F scale was still commonly used as a measure of 
authoritarianism for most of the latter half of the 20th Century. It was not until over 
three decades later that Adorno et al.’s (1950) model of authoritarianism was revisited 
and revised with respect to both measurement and conceptualization. Altemeyer’s 
(1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) both distanced the 
authoritarian construct from the Freudian theoretical origins of the Adorno et al. (1950) 
model and narrowed the definition of authoritarian to include only three components: 
authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Thus, right-
wing authoritarians are individuals who are deferent and submissive to authorities (at 
least authorities they perceive to be legitimate), hostility towards individuals and groups 
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who violate social norms or are disapproved of by authorities, and a strong commitment 
to maintaining social norms and values. Although certainly not synonymous with 
conservatism, RWA is consistently predictive of identification with conservative 
political parties and policies (particularly social policies), with correlations ranging 
from .20 to .70 (Altemeyer, 1988, Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005; Duriez & van 
Hiel, 2002; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Tarr & Lorr, 1991; van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2002; van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004).  
 Social Dominance Orientation. Another construct often associated with 
conservatism is Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). SDO can be defined as “the 
desire that one’s in-group dominate and be superior” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). 
Individuals high in SDO are likely to use various “legitimizing myths,” such as the 
belief that the word is just and people get what they deserve, in order to justify attitudes 
and policies aimed at maintaining the current social hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto 
et al., 2000; Sidanius, Devereaux, & Pratto, 1992). Furthermore, individuals high in 
SDO tend to be more nationalistic, patriotic, supportive of the military and traditional 
gender roles, and less supportive of social programs and policies designed to protect the 
rights of groups with lower status (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2000).  
Like RWA, SDO does not appear to simply reduce to conservatism (i.e., it is a 
distinct construct). SDO is reliably positively correlated with conservative beliefs, 
conservative party preferences, and self-reported conservatism, particularly with respect 
to economic conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994; Duriez & van Hiel, 2002; van Hiel & 
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Mervielde, 2002; van Hiel et al., 2004), but no correlations are high enough to suggest 
redundancy.  
Conservatism as motivated cognition. As I stated earlier, two of the more 
prominent, current models of political ideology view conservatism as an interaction 
between traits, experiences, and motivational goals. Duckitt’s (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009) dual-process model of ideology and prejudice (DPM) and Jost et al.’s (2003a; 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; Jost et al., 2007) conservatism as 
motivated social cognition model (MSC) both view not just conservatism, but political 
ideology in general, as a product of motivations and experiences revolving around 
threats to stability and security (personal as well as national). Responses to these threats 
take the form of the justification of inequality, resistance to change, nationalism, and 
other attitudes associated with conservatism. In support of this view, previous research 
has found that after experiencing a mortality salience threat, individuals give harsher 
punishment to social norm violators (Florian, Mikulancer, & Hirschberger, 2001; 
Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pysczcynski, & Lyon, 1989), are more likely to 
endorse the status quo (Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007), and hold more conservative positions 
about homosexuality, abortion, and capital punishment (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, 
Steele, & Thompson, 2009). Furthermore, other researchers have found evidence for a 
tendency for individuals exposed to terrorist attacks to shift toward conservative beliefs 
and values (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Ecchebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006). 
Despite this similarity, both the DPM and the MSC differ on key aspects. The 
primary disagreement between models is the dimensionality of conservatism. Whereas 
the MSC assumes conservatism is unidimensional, (Jost, 2009; Jost et al., 2003a), the 
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DPM, as its name suggests, assumes that RWA and SDO constitute two relatively 
independent dimensions of conservatism (Duckitt, 2001). According to the DPM, an 
RWA orientation develops as a result of a perception that the world is a dangerous place 
and a motivation to protect the self from these potential threats. Likewise, an SDO 
orientation develops from the perception of the world as competitive and a motivation 
to “survive as the fittest” and ensure the well-being and livelihood of the self or the in-
group. Thus, RWA’s focus on maintaining social norms, conformity, etc., to reduce the 
threat of a dangerous world makes it roughly analogous to cultural or social 
conservatism, whereas SDO is analogous to economic conservatism. Indeed, studies 
that have examined this supposition have found that the strongest ideological correlates 
of RWA and SDO are cultural and economic conservatism, respectively (Duriez & van 
Hiel, 2002; Duriez, van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005; van Hiel et al., 2004). Even in 
studies that do not make this distinction, RWA and SDO consistently remain associated 
with conservatism and conservative beliefs even after controlling for one another (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Pratto et al., 1994; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Thus, 
it appears that both RWA and SDO do indeed reflect different, and somewhat 
independent, aspects of conservative ideology (i.e., cultural and economic, 
respectively). 
These models help provide a foundation for understanding differences in beliefs 
and policies between liberals and conservatives. Before addressing MFT and its 
relationship to a motivated cognition account of ideology, I will first give a brief 




From Reason to Intuition – A Brief History of Moral Psychology 
For the majority of the latter half of the 20th Century, moral psychology was 
dominated by reasoning based theories of moral judgment. The most popular of these 
theories was Kohlberg’s (1963, 1969) cognitive-developmental theory of moral 
judgment. According to Kohlberg, individuals progress through a series of six stages of 
moral development, starting with an egocentric, consequentialist approach to moral 
judgment as a small child (e.g., “I get punished for doing X”,”I get rewarded for doing 
Y”) and eventually culminating in judgment based on internalized principles and values 
rather than rules or social contracts. Essentially, the stages differ in the particular rules 
and logic used to arrive at a solution to moral dilemmas. For example, reasoning in 
stages one and two (the pre-conventional level) concerns the avoidance of punishment 
and satisfaction of personal needs; reasoning in stages three and four (the conventional 
level) concerns pleasing others by conforming to social norms and respecting authority; 
and reasoning in stages five and six (the post-conventional level) concerns respecting 
the rights and will of individuals and the recognition of morality as abstract, internalized 
principles or conscience.  
 Individual differences in Kohlbergian moral development are most commonly 
assessed using the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & 
Anderson, 1974). In the DIT, individuals are asked to consider a series of moral 
dilemmas (e.g., should Heinz steal an expensive drug to save his wife’s life) and then 
rate the importance of 12 issues concerning the dilemma that either correspond to each 
of Kohlberg’s six stages or are distracter items. Individuals also rank the four most 
important issues for each dilemma. These ranks are then examined to determine the 
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extent to which each individual considers principled morality issues (stages five and 
six) in resolving these dilemmas. The DIT was the de facto measure of Kohlbergian 
moral development until it was replaced by an updated version of itself, which included 
several revisions, such as a new scoring system that accounts for not only the 
endorsement of stage five and six reasoning but also discrimination between the lower 
and higher stages and an update of the item content itself (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & 
Bebeau, 1999; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997). 
 Despite the popularity of Kohlberg’s approach, it has not been without criticism. 
Although he agreed with Kohlberg on the cognitive structural nature of moral 
judgments, Turiel (1983) argued that moral judgments are completely separate from 
social conventions and norms and that even young children can show evidence of 
principled moral reasoning. Others have argued that the DIT and Kohlberg’s theory in 
general confounds moral judgment with political ideology (Emler, 2002; Emler, 
Renwick, & Malone; 1983; Shweder, 1982; but see also Crowson & DeBacker, 2008, 
for evidence that the revised DIT is uniquely predictive of attitudes toward civil rights 
even after controlling for ideology). Kohlberg’s theories have also been criticized for 
focusing primarily on principles of justice while ignoring other values that could be 
considered moral, such as care (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). 
Nonetheless, moral psychology has been heavily influenced by the cognitive, 
rationalistic theories of Kohlberg and Turiel (Darley, 1993; Haidt, 2001; Shweder & 
Haidt, 1993). 
 In contrast to the once dominant, rationalistic perspective of morality, other 
researchers recently have emphasized the emotional aspects of moral judgment. In 
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contrast with the Kohlbergian/neo-Kohlbergian view of moral judgment as the 
development of an increasing sophistication of reasoning about justice and harm toward 
other individuals, Haidt (2001) argued that most moral judgments are rarely arrived at 
through overt reasoning processes. In his social intuitionist model of moral judgment, 
Haidt argued that moral judgments are arrived at through affect and intuition rather than 
reason, and any reasoning that does occur is a post-hoc rationalization to justify the 
judgment to either the self or others. In support of the role of affect in moral judgment, 
research has shown that violations of moral codes are associated with the experience of 
strong negative affective reactions, particularly disgust (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008; 
Rozin, Lowery, Imada, Haidt, 1999; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005). Furthermore, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) found that participants were 
more willing to select the utilitarian response in the footbridge dilemma, in which 
participants are asked whether or not they should push a large man off a footbridge onto 
the path of a runaway trolley to save the lives of five other individuals, after positive 
affect was induced by viewing a brief comedy clip. Additionally, areas of the brain 
associated with emotion (e.g., posterior cingulate gyrus) become more active while 
contemplating personal moral dilemmas such as the footbridge dilemma, whereas areas 
associated with working memory (e.g., middle frontal gyrus, right) are less active 
(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).  
 In keeping with the perspective of morality as susceptible to “hot” processes, 
other research has explored the role of motivated reasoning in influencing morality 
(Kunda, 1990; Tsang, 2002). For example, when attributions for a given behavior are 
ambiguous or self-serving, individuals are more likely to cheat (Brown, Budzek, & 
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Tamborski, 2009, Study 3; Brown et al., 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008; von Hippel, 
Lakin, & Sakarchi, 2005), engage in covert prejudice or endorse stereotypes (Monin & 
Miller, 2001; Norton, Vandello, & Darley, 2004; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 
1979), and interpret the moral transgressions of others who had previously acted 
morally in a more favorable manner (Effron & Monin, 2010). Like political ideology, 
morality appears to be driven, at least in part, by affective and motivational processes. 
Thus, just as ideological beliefs can serve to satisfy various epistemic, existential, and 
ideological goals (Jost et al., 2003), moral values also should be able to serve this 
purpose. In the following section, I will describe research examining this proposition. 
The Role of Moral Values in Political Ideology 
 Morality and political psychology have been intertwined since Adorno et al.’s 
(1950) study of the relationship between authoritarianism, fascism, and anti-Semitism. 
Indeed, RWA and SDO are examined as predictors of racial prejudice almost as much, 
if not more, than they are examined in the context of political ideology (e.g., Altemeyer, 
1988, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; McFarland, 2010; Pratto & Shih, 2000; Sidanius, Devereux, 
& Pratto, 2001; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). However, just as some have 
investigated how ideological beliefs and motivations may lead to the expression of 
(im)moral behavior, others have taken the perspective of how moral values inform 
political beliefs and behavior. 
 Several studies by Skitka and colleagues (Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, 
Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009) have explored how the 
strength of moral attitudes is associated with various types of political engagement. For 
example, Skitka and Bauman (2008) found that the extent to which people felt their 
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preferred candidate reflected their personal moral values was uniquely predictive of 
voting in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, even after controlling for party 
identification, strength of party identification, etc.  Likewise, having attitudes about 
abortion, same-sex marriage, and the Iraq war that were highly tied to central moral 
values predicted intentions to vote in the 2004 U.S. Presidential election beyond that 
predicted by the extremity of the attitude or support for a particular candidate. 
Furthermore, with the exception of attitudes toward same-sex marriage, the relationship 
between moral convictions and voting did not differ as a function of preferred 
candidate. Thus, morality mattered for those who preferred Al Gore and John Kerry 
(generally Democratic and liberal) just as much as for those who preferred George W. 
Bush (generally Republican and conservative). 
 Other studies have suggested that moral convictions also play a role in 
perceptions towards government authority. Individuals with strong moral convictions 
about physician-assisted suicide were less trusting of the U.S. Supreme Court to make a 
decision regarding the issue (Wisneski et al., 2009). Furthermore, after an actual court 
decision regarding physician-assisted suicide, individuals with strong moral convictions 
perceived the outcome as more fair or unfair (depending on their position) and viewed 
the Supreme Court itself as more or less legitimate than individuals with weaker 
conviction about the issue (Skitka et al., 2009).  
Clearly, morality is a prominent influence in political discourse for both liberals 
and conservatives. Both groups draw upon their moral values in either support or 
defense of controversial issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage. This assertion 
carries with it the rather obvious implication that in order for liberals and conservatives 
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to use moral values to arrive at differing conclusions, they must either be interpreting 
the issues differently, be drawing upon different moral values altogether, or both. I have 
already discussed how political beliefs might evolve out of differing motivations. 
Namely, conservative positions are related to a motivational need to reduce external 
threats, uncertainty, etc. (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003). I will now review research 
relevant to the second possibility: liberals and conservative differ in the actual content 
of their moral values. 
Moral Foundations Theory 
 Although traditional morality researchers have typically taken an approach to 
morality that can be applied universally (e.g., Kohlberg, 1963; Turiel, 1983), more 
recent research on morality has acknowledged the role of culture in determining the 
actual content of morality (Haidt, Koller, & Diaz, 1993; Jensen, 1997; Shweder & 
Haidt, 1993; Shweder, Much, Mahapatara, & Park, 1997). Thus, what may be 
considered a moral issue for one particular group of people, culture, or religion (e.g., the 
taboo against the consumption of pork for Judaism and Islam) may not necessarily be 
considered moral for other groups, cultures, or religions. 
 Culture is not the only determinant of moral values. Research on Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2008) illuminates how moral values differ across the ideological 
spectrum in American politics. According to MFT, there are five basic foundations from 
which people can draw their moral values. The first two foundations, harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity, roughly correspond to issues involving compassion, empathy, 
justice, and reciprocal altruism. Graham et al. (2009) refer to these foundations 
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collectively as individualizing foundations because they emphasize protecting the rights 
and welfare of individuals. The remaining three foundations, ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity, collectively referred to as binding foundations, 
emphasize maintaining structure and order within society and regulating the expression 
of hedonistic impulses (e.g., sexual desire). 
 Research on MFT has shown that the extent to which individuals differentially 
endorse the various foundations is strongly associated with self-reports of political 
ideology. Graham et al. (2009) asked participants to rate the relevance of various 
considerations pertaining to each of the five foundations in making moral judgments. 
For example, participants were asked “whether or not someone was harmed” 
(harm/care) or “whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group” 
(ingroup/loyalty) were important to think about when determining whether or not a 
given behavior is immoral. Furthermore, participants were asked to state whether they 
agreed or disagreed with various statements reflecting more concrete moral judgments 
(e.g., “justice, fairness, and equality are the most important requirements for a society” 
[fairness/reciprocity] and “respect for authority is something all children need to learn” 
[authority/respect]). Whereas people who identified as conservatives considered 
concerns related to all five foundations as relevant to relatively the same extent, liberals 
considered the individualizing foundations much more relevant to moral judgment than 
the binding foundations. This pattern was consistent for the concrete moral judgments 
(e.g., “If I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged”) as well.  
 This differential importance has been corroborated in similar studies. For 
example, McAdams et al. (2008; Study 2) interviewed participants to determine both 
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the content and development of their personal moral values. The interviews were then 
coded for the amount of concern expressed for each of MFT’s five foundations. 
Whereas concerns related to individualizing foundations were negatively correlated 
with a self-report of conservatism (i.e., liberals expressed greater concern than 
conservatives) binding foundations were positively correlated with conservatism (i.e., 
conservatives expressed greater concern than liberals). Similarly, van Leeuwen and 
Park (2009) found that a greater emphasis on binding over individualizing foundations 
partially mediated the relationship between beliefs in a dangerous world and both 
explicit and implicit measures of political conservatism.  
 Thus, it appears that the question posed at the beginning of this manuscript may 
have an answer in MFT. Why do people on opposite ends of the political spectrum so 
often view their opponents as selfish and immoral rather than simply having a 
difference of opinion? MFT research suggests that one reason this occurs is because of 
an ideological difference in the value placed on the primary foundations of morality. 
Liberals consider values such as obedience, purity, etc. to be less morally relevant than 
values related to the protection of rights, and are thus mind-boggled when 
conservatives, for example, oppose same-sex marriage because it “violates the sanctity 
of marriage.” Likewise, conservatives are often aghast that liberals are so ready to 
disregard these very same values. 
 However, many issues on which there are political divides do not draw upon 
only a single foundation. For example, the argument for and against same-sex marriage 
draws upon fairness foundations and purity foundations, respectively. According to 
previous research on MFT, conservatives should value both foundations relatively 
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equally, but yet, according to a recent survey, same-sex marriage is opposed by 77% of 
Republicans, which is traditionally the more conservative party in the United States, as 
opposed to 41% of Democrats and 55% of Independents (Pew Research Center, 2009). 
When foundations collide, how do people who strongly hold both values sacred make a 
decision? In the next section, I will describe a theoretical model that seeks to explain 
how people deal with such trade-offs. 
The Sacred Value Protection Model 
 Because most people generally have a positive self-concept, the violation of 
personal moral standards is associated with the experience of dissonance and negative 
emotions such as shame and guilt (Aronson, E., 1969; Bandura, 1990; Higgins, 1987; 
Tangney, Steuwig, & Mashek, 2007). Previous research on self-affirmation has 
demonstrated that when values important to the self are violated, individuals can 
alleviate the resulting negative affect evoked by re-affirming either the violated value 
itself or an unrelated but core aspect of the self (Aronson, J., Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; 
Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 
2001; Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983). However, research by Tetlock and colleagues 
(Tetlock, 2002, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) suggests that the 
mere contemplation of violating moral values is sufficient to motivate the need to re-
affirm one’s moral identity. In other words, no actual violation needs to occur for 
individuals to feel as if their moral identity has been compromised. 
 The Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM; Tetlock, 2002, 2003; Tetlock et al., 
2000) describes how individuals are motivated to guard against the violation of sacred 
values (which include most moral values) in favor of non-sacred or self-serving values. 
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They do this primarily via two mechanisms, moral outrage and moral cleansing. Moral 
outrage can be expressed through a variety of cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
mechanisms. More specifically, negative characteristics are attributed to both those who 
violate moral values and those who fail to explicitly condemn the violation; the 
violation of moral values elicits strong negative emotions, such as anger and contempt; 
and targets of moral outrage are often ostracized and punished. Moral cleansing refers 
to the affirmation of moral identity after it has been threatened, whether the threat is due 
to a personal violation of moral values or due to merely being exposed to a possible 
violation. 
 An important aspect of the SVPM is that it does not require an actual violation 
to occur to activate either moral outrage or moral cleansing. For example, Tetlock et al. 
(2000) examined the extent to which moral outrage and moral cleansing are affected by 
the mere exposure to taboo trade-offs. Taboo trade-offs can be broadly defined as any 
comparison or transaction that brings moral values (or any other deeply held cultural 
value, for that matter) into conflict with routine or secular values (e.g., the value of 
money; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). These types of trade-offs 
can be contrasted with both routine trade-offs (i.e., the conflict of two routine values) 
and tragic trade-offs (e.g., the conflict of two sacred values). Tetlock et al., (2000; Study 
1) found that simply judging the permissibility of a variety of taboo trade-offs (e.g., the 
buying and selling of human organs) led to greater amounts of both moral outrage and 
moral cleansing than the judgment of routine trade-offs. Furthermore, Tetlock et al. 
(2000; Study 2) had participants read a scenario in which a hospital director had to 
choose between using limited hospital funds to either save the life of only one of two 
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children (i.e., a tragic trade-off) or to chose between saving the life of a young boy or 
using the money to purchase hospital equipment and recruit better doctors (e.g., a taboo 
trade-off). These scenarios further varied as to the actual decision of the director (the 
boy or the hospital in taboo trade-off and boy A or boy B in the tragic trade-off) and 
whether the decision was framed as difficult or easy. Participants expressed greater 
moral outrage when the hospital director in the taboo trade-off scenario chose to use the 
money for purchasing hospital equipment than any other decision, regardless of whether 
it was easy or hard. Overall, participants were also more likely to engage in moral 
cleansing after being exposed to the taboo trade-off compared to the tragic trade-off, 
regardless of the actual decision or decision difficulty. 
 Tetlock et al.’s (2000) research describes how individuals react to others 
engaging in taboo or tragic trade-offs, but how do people behave when they become the 
decision-makers in a tragic or taboo trade-off scenario? When confronted with taboo 
trade-offs, individuals may reinterpret the trade-offs in terms of routine values, or they 
may even procrastinate or outright refuse to make a decision (McGraw & Tetlock, 
2005; Tetlock, 2000). Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) had participants consider 
hypothetical scenarios in which they were asked to make routine, taboo, and tragic 
trade-offs and then assessed participants’ reports of both decision difficulty and 
negative affect for each decision. Whereas participants rated the taboo trade-off as the 
easiest decision to make, tragic trade-offs were the most difficult. However, negative 
affect following the decision was greater after a taboo trade-off than a routine trade-off 
and greater still after a tragic trade-off.  
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 That is not to say that people avoid making value trade-offs at all costs, or when 
they do, they do so only by reinterpreting the issues to ones that are more mundane. 
Tetlock (1986) asked participants to write their thoughts and decide on policy issues 
that contained conflicting values (e.g., “Should the C.I.A. have the authority to open the 
mail of American citizens as part of its efforts against foreign spies?”). When the 
conflicting values were both similar to each other and high in importance, they were 
less confident in their eventual choice, but they did engage in more integrative and 
complex reasoning (i.e., the recognition of the conflicts with issues and developed 
connections between these issues) in making their decision. There is also evidence that 
the extent to which individuals will engage in complex reasoning is moderated by 
political ideology. Tetlock (Tetlock, 1983, 1984; Tetlock, Bernzweig, & Gallant, 1985) 
found that the speeches and opinions of liberals and moderates regarding various value 
conflicts were typically higher in integrative reasoning than conservatives for U.S 
Senators, British Parliamentarians, and Supreme Court justices. Additionally, Critcher, 
Huber, Ho, and Koleva (2009) found that when asking participants to justify their 
seemingly inconsistent attitudes toward abortion and capital punishment (for one and 
against the other), liberals were more likely to admit the presence of a value trade-off, 
whereas conservatives were more likely to deny the comparison. 
 In summary, the SVPM asserts that people generally find trade-offs of sacred 
and moral values to be aversive. Engaging in taboo trade-offs often evokes moral 
outrage among observers, and even the consideration of such trade-offs is sufficient for 
actors and observers alike to feel “morally contaminated” and thus engage in moral 
cleansing. Additionally, people are generally reluctant to make taboo and tragic trade-
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offs themselves, but will do so if necessary by reinterpreting the trade-off as a less 
severe conflict or by engaging in integratively complex reasoning. Consistent with a 
model of conservative ideology as, at least in part, a mechanism for reducing ambiguity 
and uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003), liberals (at least those in Western, industrialized 
countries) tend to be more willing than conservatives to engage in the latter rather than 
the former. 
Overview of the Current Studies 
 As suggested by the examples proffered at the beginning of this manuscript, 
differences between liberals and conservatives appear to be anything but mere 
disagreements about proper course and policy. Instead, many issues beholden to both 
liberals and conservatives are subject to and often framed in terms of moral values. To 
make matters more complicated, whereas the moral values of conservatives encompass 
issues relating to care, justice, obedience, loyalty, and purity, liberals typically are much 
more concerned with issues pertaining to the former two (i.e., care and justice) rather 
than the latter three (Graham et al., 2009). Thus, conservatives are dismayed by the 
relatively high tolerance liberals seem to have for illegal immigration, as turning a blind 
eye to such behavior violates the moral imperative of being loyal to your own. 
Likewise, liberals do not understand the conservative opposition of same-sex marriage. 
Whereas conservatives see the potential violation of purity/sanctity virtues, liberals 
focus more on the fairness of allowing two consensual adults the same rights as 
heterosexual couples (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). 
 Many moral issues, however, do not invoke, to use the terminology of MFT, 
only individualizing or only binding foundations. For example, moral opinions about 
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same-sex marriage can draw upon both sanctity (“marriage is a holy institution that has 
always been between a man and a woman”) and fairness (“same-sex couples should be 
allowed to marry for love just like any other couple”). Thus, the type of trade-off 
involved in these issues is dependent on one’s political leanings. Because of the greater 
moral relevance liberals place on individualizing foundations, forming an opinion on 
same-sex marriage should be akin to a taboo trade-off for them (the sacred value of 
fairness versus the ironically non-sacred value of sanctity). For conservatives, however, 
the same conflict of values should be more similar to a tragic trade-off (as fairness and 
sanctity are both sacred values). 
 Graham et al. (2009; Study 3) examined the relationship of political ideology 
with taboo trade-offs across the five foundations specified by MFT. Specifically, 
participants were asked to specify (on an 8-point Likert scale) how much money it 
would require to convince them to violate a particular foundation. Individualizing 
foundations were equally taboo for both liberals and conservatives (i.e., they required, 
on average, between $100,000 and $1,000,000 to perform the violation). When it came 
to binding foundations, however, conservatives required more money to violate the 
foundation than liberals. However, Graham et al. (2009) did not examine whether or not 
liberals and conservative would differ on tragic trade-offs similar to the example 
described above (individualizing versus binding foundations), yet predictions can be 
derived from MFT and subsequent research on how individuals would react to such 
trade-offs. In the current studies, I tested these predictions regarding tragic trade-offs. 
Specifically, in Study 1, I tested whether liberals and conservatives differed in their 
affective reactions and choices regarding trade-offs between individualizing and 
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binding foundations. In Study 2, I examined whether allowing participants to credential 
themselves on a particular moral foundation (Monin & Miller, 2001) both reduced the 
impact of a tragic trade-off on negative affect and also facilitated making a decision in 
trade-off scenarios. 
Study 1 
 Study 1 provided an additional test for MFT by determining whether liberals and 
conservatives differ when asked to make trade-offs between individualizing and binding 
foundations. Based on previous research in MFT, liberals predominately consider 
individualizing foundations relevant to their moral judgments, whereas conservatives 
consider both individualizing and binding foundations relevant (Graham et al., 2009; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Therefore, when these foundations are pitted against each other, 
liberals should be more likely to view such conflicts as a taboo trade-off (where the 
individualizing foundation is the sacred value and the binding foundation is the secular 
or routine value). Because conservatives view both individualizing and binding 
foundations as sacred, they should view the same conflicts as tragic trade-offs. 
Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) demonstrated that although negative affect 
followed the pondering of both taboo and tragic trade-offs, negativity was greatest after 
tragic trade-offs, and tragic trade-offs were rated as considerably more difficult to make. 
Furthermore, because moral trade-offs, especially tragic trade-offs, are a source of 
dissonance (i.e., a threat to the perception of the self as moral; Aronson, E., 1968; 
Tetlock et al., 2000), moral trade-offs should also be associated with an increase in 
arousal. Thus, if the perception of trade-offs between individualizing and binding 
foundations varies as a function of political ideology, so too should the experience of 
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negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty. Specifically, because both liberals and 
conservatives value individualizing foundations, individualizing versus individualizing 
trade-offs should be interpreted as tragic regardless of ideology and should therefore not 
differ in negative affect, arousal, or decision difficulty for both liberals and 
conservatives.  
Hypothesis 1a: Political ideology will not predict negative affect, arousal, or 
decision difficulty for individualizing versus individualizing trade-offs.  
Because conservatives are more likely than liberals to endorse binding 
foundations as morally relevant, however, trade-offs between individualizing and 
binding foundations should be viewed as tragic trade-offs for conservatives but as taboo 
trade-offs for liberals. Thus, conservatives should experience greater negative affect and 
arousal and report greater decision difficulty than liberals on these types of trade-offs.  
Hypothesis 1b: Political ideology will be predictive of negative affect, arousal, 
and decision difficulty for individualizing versus binding trade-offs, such that 
conservatives will experience greater levels of these variables than liberals will.  
Finally, binding versus binding foundations should be interpreted as tragic trade-
offs for conservatives but routine trade-offs for liberals. Again, conservatives should 
report greater negative affect, arousal, and greater decision difficulty than liberals for 
these trade-offs. 
Hypothesis 1c: Political ideology will be predictive of negative affect, arousal, 
and decision difficulty for binding versus binding trade-offs, such that 
conservatives will experience greater levels of these variables than liberals will.  
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The perception of moral trade-offs as tragic, taboo, or routine should also 
influence how one chooses to resolve the trade-off. For conservatives, both 
individualizing versus individualizing and binding versus binding trade-offs involve a 
tragic conflict between two moral values. As such, conservatives should show relatively 
no preference for either option in these types of dilemmas. Although liberals endorse 
binding foundations to a lesser extent than do conservatives, trade-offs involving only 
binding foundations should lack a clear preferred option for them as well (both options 
involve relatively routine or secular values). Therefore, liberals should show relatively 
no preference within these trade-offs as well.  
Hypothesis 2a: Political ideology will not predict decision preference for both 
individualizing versus individualizing and binding versus binding trade-offs. 
Furthermore, both liberals and conservatives will show no preference for either 
option. 
Because liberals should view individualizing versus binding trade-offs as taboo, 
they should predominately choose to uphold the individualizing value. Because 
conservatives should view the same trade-off as tragic, they should show relatively no 
preference for either option (i.e., both choices reflect important moral values). However, 
it could be argued that conservatives who are strongly committed to their beliefs would 
have greater access to the motivational goals of security, uncertainty avoidance, and 
group dominance associated with conservatism (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003) and 
would thus be more likely to choose the option that was more aligned with these goals 
(Critcher et al., 2009; Studies 2 and 3; Fazio, Williams, & Herr, 1983). Therefore, 
whereas individuals who are moderate or slightly conservative might be more inclined 
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to show no preference, participants who are strongly conservative might be more 
inclined to uphold binding foundations over individualizing foundations. 
Hypothesis 2b: Political ideology will predict decision preference for 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs. Specifically, liberals will be more 
likely to favor the individualizing option for individualizing versus binding 
trade-offs than conservatives will. Conservatives either will be more likely to 
show no preference for either option or will be more likely to favor the binding 
option.  
In addition to these primary hypotheses, this study also explored whether moral 
trade-offs may play a role in predicting positions on contemporary social issues. As 
argued earlier, ideological differences between various political issues may be due, at 
least in part, to differential endorsement of individualizing and binding foundations. In 
particular, opinions about issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and the Iraq war 
appear to have a strong moral component (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Another 
contemporary issue that appears to have divided support among liberals and 
conservatives is the passage of a major health care reform bill in 2010. Each of these 
issues can be interpreted in terms of conflicting moral foundations. For example, same-
sex marriage can be construed as a trade-off between the sanctity or purity of marriage 
versus the fairness of equal rights for homosexuals and heterosexuals. If positions on 
these issues are indeed related to differential endorsement of moral foundations, then 
the affective reactions and decisions on the moral trade-off scenarios, individualizing 
versus binding trade-offs in particular, should mediate the relationship between political 
ideology and position. In other words, liberals, for example, should be more likely than 
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conservatives to endorse the individualizing over the binding foundation in an 
individualizing versus binding trade-off, and the degree of this preference should itself 
be predictive of support for same-sex marriage. 
Hypothesis 3: The responses to individualizing versus binding moral trade-offs, 
but not individualizing versus individualizing or binding versus binding trade-
offs, will at least partially mediate the association between political ideology and 
attitudes toward contemporary social issues.  
Finally, previous research has suggested an empirical distinction between 
economic and cultural conservatism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Crowson, 2009; Duckitt, 
2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Duriez & van Hiel, 2002). Therefore, the current study 
included single item measures assessing participant’s identification as either an 
economic conservative or a cultural conservative. RWA (Altemeyer, 1998) and SDO 
(Pratto et al., 1994) were also assessed. There were no specific hypotheses regarding 
these measures, however, as they were strictly exploratory. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 346 individuals recruited using Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (Mturk), a crowd-sourcing website that allows individuals to post requests for 
work to be performed (“HITS”). Other individuals who sign up for this site as workers 
can then complete HITS of their choosing for monetary compensation. Although MTurk 
is a global website, participation in this study was restricted to those with an IP address 
from within the United States. Thirty-six participants were excluded from all analyses 
because they completed all questionnaires in less than five minutes, and an additional 
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17 were excluded because they were not United States citizens. Of the remaining 293 
participants, 94 were male (199 female) with an average age of 35.31 years (SD = 13.41 
years; Min = 18 years; Max = 83 years). The majority of participants were White 
(80.2%; Black, 5.5%; Asian, 3.4%; Hispanic, 2.7%; Other, 8.2%), and Christian 
(62.1%; Atheist/Agnostic, 24.2%; Jewish, 2.0%; Buddhist, 1.4%; Muslim, 1.0%; Other, 
9.3%). Finally, participants were also diverse concerning their highest level of 
education (Did not finish High School, 0.7%; High School Diploma/GED, 33.8%; 
Associate’s Degree, 20.8%; Bachelor’s Degree, 29.0%; Graduate Degree, 15.0%; non-
response, 0.7%) and yearly income (under $20,000, 32.4%; $20,000 - $39,000, 27.6%; 
$40,000 - $59,000, 20.8%; $60,000 - $79,000, 6.8%; $80,000 - $99,000, 6.8%; 
$100,000 - $999,999, 5.1%; over $1,000,000, 0.3%). All participants were compensated 
$.25 for their participation in this study. 
Measures 
 Reactions to moral trade-offs. Negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and 
the actual decision were assessed in a 16 item scale (five items for affect, arousal, and 
difficulty plus one item for the actual decision) in which participants responded on a 7-
point Likert scale (Appendix A). Example items included “I feel good about making 
this decision” (negative affect), “I am very nervous about making the wrong decision” 
(arousal), and “For this decision, I feel certain which option to choose” (decision 
difficulty). The decision difficulty measure was taken directly from Hanselmann and 
Tanner (2008). The decision preference item asked participants to choose which option 
within the dilemma they preferred using a 7-point Likert scale anchored by –3 
(“Definitely Option 1”) and +3 (“Definitely Option 2”). The order of the items for 
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affect, arousal, and difficulty were given in a random order for each participant. The 
item assessing the actual decision preference, however, was always presented last. 
 Cronbach’s alphas were calculated for negative affect, arousal, and decision 
difficulty for each scenario and then averaged to estimate internal reliability. The 
average reliability for negative affect was good (α = .84). However, the reliabilities for 
arousal and difficulty were not optimal (α = .56 and α = .72, respectively). Analyses of 
item-total correlations revealed that the items “I feel excited about making this 
decision” (for arousal) and “I feel very ambivalent about this decision” (for decision 
difficulty) did not correlate with the rest of their respective scales. Removing the two 
items substantially improved the reliabilities (α = .81 for arousal and α = .80 for 
decision difficulty). Responses for each variable were aggregated across scenarios to 
create a single score.  
 Political ideology. Participants’ political ideology was assessed with a single 
item (“To what extent do you identify as liberal versus conservative?”). Participants 
responded with a 7-point Likert scale anchored by 1 (“Very Liberal”) and 7 (“Very 
Conservative”). In addition to the unidimensional measure of political ideology, 
participants also responded to two items regarding their endorsement of cultural and 
economic conservatism. These items and the remaining demographic items can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 Contemporary social issues. Participants were asked about their support of 
four contemporary issues (Appendix C). For each of these issues (same-sex marriage, 
military action in Iraq, abortion, and public health insurance), participants were asked to 
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state their support for each issue (or lack of support in the case of abortion) using a 7-
point Likert scale anchored with 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) and 7 (“Strongly Agree”). 
 RWA and SDO. Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) were assessed using abbreviated versions of both the 22-item version 
of Altemeyer’s (2006) RWA scale and Pratto et al.’s (1994) 16-item SDO scale 
(Appendix D). The measure of RWA used in the current study consisted of three items 
selected from the longer 22-item version. Items were selected based on the results of a 
confirmatory factor analysis performed on previous data containing the full-length 
RWA. The three items with the highest factor loadings were used in the current study (α 
= .74). The SDO measure also consisted of three items selected from the original 16-
item version. The items were selected in the same manner as with RWA (α = .83).   
Procedure 
 After finding a brief description of the study listed on MTurk, participants 
followed a link to the actual study, which was hosted by Qualtrics 
(http://www.qualtrics.com), a survey-hosting website, where they first gave consent to 
participate in the study. Participants were then randomly assigned to complete either 
individualizing versus individualizing trade-offs (INDV vs. INDV), binding versus 
binding trade-offs (BIND vs. BIND), or individualizing versus binding trade-offs 
(INDV vs. BIND). For each set of trade-offs, participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as the actor in three scenarios that described a potential moral dilemma (see 
Appendix E for a list of scenarios used in this study). Following the scenario, the 
participant was given two options from which to choose a course of action. Each option 
represented the endorsement of either an individualizing or binding foundation, 
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depending on which set of scenarios the participant received. The scenarios were 
designed so that the moral values represented by each option were opposed to one 
another. In other words, preference for one option was always relative to the other 
option. For example, one scenario (individualizing versus binding) asked participants to 
imagine they were a human resources manager at an accounting firm and that they 
ultimately had to choose between one of two candidates for a position. One of the 
candidates happened to be a member of the actor’s church and was described as sharing 
the same values and beliefs as the actor (ingroup/loyalty). The other candidate, 
however, had slightly better qualifications on paper than the other candidates 
(fairness/reciprocity). All scenarios were pilot tested to ensure that each option tapped 
the appropriate foundations (individualizing or binding; see Appendix F for a brief 
description of the pilot study).1 After each scenario, participants completed the 
measures of negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and then made their actual 
decision. 
 Next, participants completed the assessment of contemporary social issues, the 
measures of RWA and SDO (presented in random order), and a demographics 
questionnaire, which included the aforementioned assessments of political ideology. 
Finally, participants underwent a suspicion check to ensure, among other things, that 
they had not previously participated in a similar study on Mturk and were debriefed. At 
the conclusion of the study, participants were given a password to enter in a response  
box on the MTurk website. This password served to confirm that participants did indeed 
follow the link and complete the study and was used to award compensation. 
1. Data from the pilot study suggested that, despite the face validity of the scenarios, some of the 
options for the individualizing versus individualizing and binding versus binding trade-offs did not 




 Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all political ideology items 
(general, cultural, and economic), RWA, SDO, and attitudes toward contemporary 
social issues can be found in Table 1. 
Omnibus analysis 
Negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and decision preference were 
subjected to a MANCOVA with trade-off type (INDV vs. INDV; BIND vs. BIND; 
INDV vs. BIND) as a between-groups factor and political ideology as a covariate. 
Ideology was standardized prior to all analyses in order to facilitate interpretation of any 
interactions (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003), and decision preferences were 
coded so that higher numbers reflect greater preferences for binding foundations in 
INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. There was no significant interaction between ideology and 
trade-off type (Roy’s Largest Root = .03), F(4, 282) = 1.79, p = .13. In addition, there 
was no association between ideology and the dependent variables (Roy’s Largest Root 
= .02), F(4, 282) = 1.06, p = .38. However, there was a main effect of trade-off type 
(Roy’s Largest Root = .44), F(4, 282) = 31.05, p < .001. Results were similar for the 
other multivariate test statistics (Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, and Hotelling’s Trace) 
as well. 
Follow-up univariate analyses were performed to explore the main effect of 
trade-off type further. The main effect of negative affect approached significance,  






Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Political Ideology Items (General, Cultural, and Economic Conservatism), Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and Attitudes toward Contemporary Social Issues (Same-Sex 
Marriage, the Iraq War, Abortion, and Publically Provided Health Care).  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M SD 
1. general —            3.49 1.51 
2. cultural .46 —           2.91 1.83 
3. economic .61 .30 —          4.16 1.78 
4. RWA .52 .72 .28 —       –1.95 1.76 
5. SDO .41 .32 .30 .39 —        2.37 1.28 
6. same-sex  –.50  –.58  –.26  –.69  –.35 —       5.31 2.16 
7. Iraq .44 .31 .32 .28 .24  –.18 —      3.31 1.82 
8. abortion .37 .51 .20 .57 .22  –.54 .25 —     2.59 2.01 
9. health-care  –.53  –.27  –.47  –.31  –.48 .35  –.32  –.24 —    5.04 1.79 





Mean Levels of Negative Affect, Arousal, Decision Difficulty, and Decision Preference 
as a Function of Trade-off Type. 
 Trade-off Type 
Dependent variables INDV vs. INDV BIND vs. BIND INDV vs. BIND 
1. affect 4.57a (0.11)      4.31ab (0.10) 4.21b (0.10) 
2. arousal 4.97a (0.10)      4.40b (0.09) 4.70a (0.09) 
3. difficulty 4.18a (0.10)      3.86ab (0.09) 3.63b (0.09) 
4. decision 1.84a (0.06)      2.02a (0.06) 2.21b (0.05) 
Note. Decision was recoded so that the range for decision = 0 – 3, with higher levels indicating more 
extreme preferences towards either option across scenarios as opposed to no preference (i.e., the midpoint 
of the original scale. Means with different subscripts within each row are significantly different from each 
other at p < .05. 
 
correction to control for Type I error revealed that negative affect for INDV vs. INDV 
trade-offs was greater than negative affect for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs (Table 2). The 
main effect for arousal was significant, F(2, 284) = 10.99, p < .001, η2 = .07. Both 
INDV vs. INDV and INDV vs. BIND trade-offs elicited more arousal than BIND vs. 
BIND trade-offs. The main effect for decision difficulty was also significant, F(2, 284) 
= 8.01, p < .001, η2 = .05. INDV vs. INDV trade-offs were more difficult than INDV 
vs. BIND trade-offs and marginally more difficult than BIND vs. BIND trade-offs. For 
decision preference, determining whether there is a preference for a particular option for 
INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs would not have a clear interpretation. 
Thus, before conducting the univariate test on decision preference, scores were 
transformed into absolute values to whether preference for any option compared to no 




effect of trade-off type on decision preference was significant, F(2, 284) = 10.69, p < 
.001, η2 = .07. Participants were more likely to have a clear preference for any particular 
option, as opposed to no clear preference) for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs than for INDV 
vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs. 
 Although the omnibus analyses did not reveal any significant interactions 
between political ideology and trade-off type on the four dependent variables (negative 
affect, arousal, decision preference), the scenarios were not constructed to be equivalent 
across trade-off type on other factors that might influence negative affect, arousal, etc. 
(e.g., dilemma severity). As a result, the following analyses were used to test each 
hypothesis directly. 
Political Ideology and Negative Affect, Arousal, and Decision Difficulty 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that political ideology would not predict negative affect, 
arousal and decision difficulty for INDV vs. INDV trade-offs (Hypothesis 1a), but 
would be associated with these variables for INDV vs. BIND (Hypothesis 1b) and 
BIND vs. BIND (Hypothesis 1c) trade-offs, such that conservatives will experience 
greater levels of these variables than will liberals. To test these hypotheses, simple 
slopes analyses were performed for all three dependent variables to examine the 
association of ideology and negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty for each 
trade-off type separately. 
As predicted, the simple slope of ideology on negative affect for INDV vs. 
INDV trade-offs was not significant, β = .04, t(284) = 0.33, ns. The simple slope for 
INDV vs. BIND also conformed to predictions. Political ideology was positively 




= .03, sr2 = .02. Participants experienced more negative affect in response to these 
scenarios as they became more conservative as opposed to liberal. Contrary to 
predictions, the simple slope of ideology on negative affect for BIND vs. BIND trade-
offs was not significant, β = –.03, t(284) = –0.31, ns (Figure 1a). 
The results for arousal were similar to that for negative affect. Consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the simple slope of ideology on arousal for INDV vs. INDV 
trade-offs was not significant, β = .05, t(284) = 0.48, ns, but the simple slope for INDV 
vs. BIND trade-offs was significant, β = .19, t(284) = 1.98, p = .05, sr2 = 
.01.Participants experienced greater levels of arousal in response to INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs as they became more conservative. Contrary to Hypothesis 1c, however, the 
simple slope for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs was not significant, β = .09, t(284) = 0.97, 
ns (Figure 1b). 
Finally, the results for decision difficulty were again similar to that for negative 
affect and arousal. The simple slope of ideology on decision difficulty for INDV vs. 
INDV trade-offs was not significant, β = .01, t(284) = 0.05, ns, but the simple slope for 
INDV vs. BIND trade-offs was again significant, β = .21, t(284) = 2.06, p = .04, sr2 = 
.01. The simple slope for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, however, was not significant, β = 
.06, t(284) = 0.56, ns (Figure 1c). In summary, simple slopes analyses revealed support 
on all three variables for Hypotheses 1a (a null effect of ideology on INDV vs. INDV 
trade-offs) and Hypothesis 1b (a positive association between ideology and the three 
variables for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs). Hypothesis 1c (a positive association between 





























Figure 1. Negative affect (A), arousal (B), decision difficulty (C), and decision preference (D) as a 
function of political ideology and trade-off type. INDV = individualizing, BIND = binding. For A, B, and 
C, range = 1 to 7. For D, range = –3 to 3 with 0 indicating no preference. Also for D, higher values reflect 
a preference for binding foundations for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs only. 
 
Decision Preference 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that political ideology would not be associated with 
decision preference for INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs and that all 
participants would show relatively no preference for one option over the other. A simple 
slopes analysis of the association between political ideology and decision preference at 



























































decision preference for either INDV vs. INDV, β = –.16, t(284) = –1.63, p = .11, or 
BINDV vs. BINDV trade-offs, β = –.01, t(284) = –0.11, ns (Figure 1d). Although not 
significant, the simple slope for INDV vs. INDV trade-offs was larger than expected 
and warranted a follow-up investigation. Repeating this analysis for each of the three 
scenarios separately revealed that ideology predicted decision preference in INDV vs. 
INDV trade-offs that involved trading-off between the Harm/care and 
Fairness/reciprocity foundation (scenarios 2 and 3). For both scenarios, conservatives 
were more likely than liberals were to prefer the option endorsing the 
Fairness/reciprocity foundation rather than the option endorsing the Harm/care 
foundation, β = .24, t(287) = 2.45, p = .02, sr2 = .02, for scenario 2, and β = –.20, t(287) 
= –1.99, p = .05, sr2 = .01, for scenario 3.  
 One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality verified that decision 
preference within both INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs were normally 
distributed and not bimodal (i.e., clear preferences for both options with few 
participants indicating no preference), both ps > .20. Thus, decision preference was 
subjected to a one-sample t-test with a null hypothesis of no preference (i.e., “0”) for 
both INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs in order to examine whether 
participants preferred any option as opposed to no option at all. Decision preference for 
INDV vs. INDV trade-offs (M =0.46; SD = 1.10) was significantly different from zero, 
t(83) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.42, as was BIND vs. BIND trade-offs (M = –0.57; SD = 
1.24), t(96) = –4.55, p < .001, d = 0.46. Examination of the individual scenarios for 
INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs revealed that out of five scenarios that 




presented second, regardless of what foundation that option endorsed. As this was the 
only pattern that seemed to emerge from the analysis of the individual scenarios, any 
further interpretation should be treated with caution. 
 Finally, Hypothesis 2 also predicted that ideology would predict decision 
preference within INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. Prior to testing this simple slope, decision 
preference was coded such that higher scores reflect greater preference toward the 
binding foundation. The simple slope of ideology on decision preference for INDV vs. 
BIND trade-offs was consistent with this prediction, β = .15, t(284) = 1.82, p = .07, sr2 
= .01. Although all participants generally preferred the option that endorsed 
individualizing foundations, this preference decreased as participants became more 
conservative.  
 In summary, Hypothesis 2 received only partial support. As predicted, political 
ideology was significantly associated with decision preference for INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs but not for INDV vs. INDV or BIND vs. BIND trade-offs. Although the 
aggregate decision preference score for INDV vs. INDV trade-offs was not statistically 
significant, closer examination of the individual scenarios suggested that conservative 
participants were more likely to prefer the Fairness/reciprocity foundation when traded-
off against the Harm/care foundation. Finally, contrary to predictions, there was a 
preference for a particular option (as opposed to no preference) for INDV vs. INDV and 
BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, although the meaning of this preference is unclear, as it 
appears to be driven by the serial position of the response options rather than a content-
based preference. Furthermore, even though endorsement of the option corresponding to 




conservative, all participants preferred the individualizing option to some extent 
regardless of ideology. 
Mediation Analyses 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that the responses to INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, but not 
INDV vs. INDV or BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, will at least partially mediate any 
association between political ideology and attitudes toward several contemporary social 
issues (same-sex marriage, the Iraq war, abortion, and health care reform). Because the 
attitudes toward social issues were only weakly correlated with one another (Table 1), 
each issue was tested in a separate model using the PROCESS  macro for SPSS version 
17.0 (Hayes, 2012). In addition to calculating the confidence intervals of conditional 
indirect effects using bias-corrected bootstrap re-sampling techniques (which is 
recommended over traditional Sobel tests of indirect effects; Preacher, Rucker, & 
Hayes, 2007), PROCESS also allows for multiple mediators operating in parallel. 
However, one limitation of PROCESS is that moderators may be continuous or 
dichotomous, but not categorical with more than two groups. Therefore, INDV vs. 
INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs were collapsed to create a dichotomous trade-off 
type variable comparing INDV vs. BIND trade-offs to the non-INDV vs. BIND trade-
offs. Trade-off type was then recoded using weighted effects codes (INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs = “1”; non-INDV vs. BIND trade-offs = “–0.5”). Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals for all indirect effects were calculated using 10,000 bootstrap 
samples. All continuous variables were standardized prior to the analyses. 
The moderated mediation models tested were similar, but not identical, to the fifth 




and trade-off type on attitudes toward each contemporary social issue (same-sex 
marriage, the Iraq war, abortion, and health care reform), paths were estimated for 
indirect effects through each of four potential mediators (negative affect, arousal, 
decision difficulty, and decision preference). Trade-off type was allowed to moderate 
both the paths from ideology to the mediators, and from the mediators to the social 
issue. As trade-off type was not expected to moderate the direct effect from ideology to 
social issue, this interaction was not included in the analysis. Figure 3 displays an 
example of this model along with standardized path coefficients for same-sex marriage. 
The conditional indirect effects for all mediators along with their associated confidence 
intervals are summarized in Table 3. The direct effects of ideology were significant for 
support for same-sex marriage, β = –.51, t(279) = –9.86, p < .001, sr2 = .25, support for 
the Iraq war, β = .42, t(278) = 7.90, p < .001, sr2 = .17, opposition to abortion, β = .38, 
t(278) = 6.77, p < .001, sr2 = .13, and support for universal health care reform, β = –.53, 
t(278) = –10.29, p < .001, sr2 = .26. These regression coefficients are nearly identically 
to the zero-sum correlations between general political ideology and attitudes toward 
contemporary social issues presented in Table 1. Thus, any significant conditional 
indirect effects would likely explain only a small portion of the association between 
ideology and attitudes or be a Type I error. Nonetheless, several significant effects were 
detected and are discussed below. 
For same-sex marriage, there were no significant indirect effects for non-INDV 
vs. BIND trade-offs, as predicted. For INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, there were also no 
significant indirect effects, although the indirect effect for arousal was nearly significant 









Figure 2. Moderated mediation model of the effect of ideology on attitudes toward same-sex marriage through negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and 
decision preference and moderated by trade-off type. Error terms and main effects of trade-off type on both the mediators and attitudes toward social issues are 
omitted for clarity. All path coefficients are standardized. Bold font indicates interaction coefficients. Regular font indicates main effects of ideology on 
mediators and attitudes toward same-sex marriage and the main effects of the mediators on attitude toward same-sex marriage. Coefficients marked with † are 




























Conditional Indirect Effects of Mediators on Contemporary Social Issues. 
               INDV vs. BIND               Other trade-offs 
Mediator     Effect     LL    UL Effect    LL  UL 
1. Same-sex       
   Affect     .02 (.03)     –.0162       .0997      .00 (.01)    –.0217      .0264 
   Arousal   –.04 (.03)     –.1224       .0000      .01 (.02)    –.0204      .0684 
   Difficulty     .01 (.02)     –.0280       .0524      .00 (.01)    –.0082      .0268 
   Preference     .00 (.02)     –.0476       .0233      .01 (.01)    –.0048      .0583 
2. Iraq       
   Affect   –.06 (.04)     –.1615     –.0026      .00 (.01)    –.0387      .0206 
   Arousal     .02 (.03)     –.0155       .0939      .01 (.01)    –.0527      .0052 
   Difficulty     .03 (.03)     –.0105       .1103      .01 (.01)    –.0099      .0478 
   Preference     .05 (.04)       .0000       .1444      .00 (.01)    –.0322      .0090 
3. Abortion       
   Affect     .03 (.03)     –.1174       .0180      .00 (.01)    –.0352      .0210 
   Arousal     .04 (.03)     –.0087       .1222    –.02 (.03)    –.0842      .0280 
   Difficulty     .01 (.02)     –.0181       .0800      .01 (.02)    –.0191      .0521 
   Preference     .00 (.02)     –.0408       .0626    –.01 (.01)    –.0528      .0043 
4. Health Care       
   Affect   –.03 (.03)    –.0986       .0071      .00 (.01)    –.0099      .0227 
   Arousal     .03 (.03)    –.0005       .1093      .01 (.01)    –.0081      .0509 
   Difficulty     .01 (.02)    –.0248       .0566      .00 (.01)    –.0083      .0247 
   Preference   –.03 (.02)    –.1008     –.0005      .01 (.01)    –.0045      .0473 
Note. All indirect effect path coefficients are standardized. Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap 
estimated standard errors. INDV vs. BIND = conditional indirect effects for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs; 
Other trade-offs = conditional indirect effects for combined INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-
offs; Effect = path coefficient for the indirect effect; LL = lower limit of the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
interval; UL = upper limit of the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval; Indirect effects in bold are 
significant at p < .05. Bootstrap samples = 10,000. 
 
Follow-up analyses revealed that participants experienced more arousal as they became 
more conservative regardless of the type of trade-off to which they were exposed, β = 




less support for same-sex marriage, but only for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, β = –.22, 
t(279) = –1.85, p = .07, sr2 = .01. 
For the Iraq war, there were again no indirect effects for non-INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs. For INDV vs. BIND trade-offs the indirect effect through negative affect was 
significant. However, neither the interaction between ideology and trade-off type for 
negative affect or the interaction between negative affect and trade-off type for attitude 
toward the Iraq war, a prerequisite for testing conditional indirect effects, was 
significant, p = .11 and p = .53, respectively. The indirect effect for decision preference 
was nearly significant (the lower limit of the confidence interval was exactly 0). As 
participants became more conservative, they were more likely to endorse the option 
endorsing binding foundations, but only for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, β = .15, t(285) 
= 1.71, p = .09, sr2 = .01. Preference for the binding foundations was then positively 
associated for support for the Iraq war, but again only for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, β 
= .37, t(278) = 3.15, p < .01, sr2 = .03. 
 For opposition to abortion, there were no significant indirect effects for any type 
of trade-off. Finally, for health care reform, there were once again no significant 
indirect effects for non-INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. For INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, 
there was only an indirect effect of decision preference. Conservatives were more likely 
to prefer the option endorsing the binding foundation, but only for INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs, β = .15, t(285) = 1.71, p = .09, sr2 = .01. Endorsing the binding foundation 
on these trade-offs was then associated with less support for health care reform, β = –




 In summary, support for the hypothesis that responses to INDV vs. BIND trade-
offs, but not non-INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, would mediate associations between 
political ideology and several contemporary social issues was limited. As predicted, 
there were no conditional indirect effects for non-INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. However, 
of the sixteen possible conditional indirect effects for INDV vs, BIND trade-offs (four 
issues with four potential mediators each), only two were significant (four including the 
two mediators with confidence intervals ending exactly at 0), and in all cases, the direct 
effect of ideology on each social issue remained essentially unchanged from the zero-
sum correlation. Because of this, there is a strong probability that at least one of these 
significant effects is due to a Type I error and should be interpreted with caution. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 As several researchers have argued that political ideology is best operationalized 
as a two dimensional construct consisting of economic and cultural conservatism (e.g., 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), analyses testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 were re-run substituting 
economic and cultural conservatism (and the related constructs RWA and SDO) in 
place of general ideology. Rather than describing the results of these exploratory 
analyses in full, I will limit my discussion to instances of agreement with the uni-
dimensional ideology and notable differences. 
 Cultural conservatism displayed similar associations with responses to INDV vs. 
BIND trade-offs as general political ideology (Table 4). Cultural conservatism was 
positively associated with arousal, decision difficulty, and preference for binding 
foundations. However, cultural conservatism was not associated with negative affect. 





Simple Slope Regression Coefficients for Cultural Conservatism, Economic 
Conservatism, RWA, and SDO within INDV vs. BIND Trade-offs. 
           β t  p   sr2 
1. Cultural     
   affect            .08 0.67 .50 — 
   arousal            .21 1.96 .05 .01 
   difficulty            .22 1.96 .05 .01 
   preference            .17 1.87 .06 .01 
2. Economic     
   affect            .21 2.14 .03 .02 
   arousal            .08 0.84 .40 — 
   difficulty            .14 1.43 .15 — 
   preference            .11 1.34 .18 — 
3. RWA     
   affect             .26 2.74 .01 .03 
   arousal             .30 3.34   .001 .03 
   difficulty             .26 2.66 .01 .02 
   preference             .15 1.95 .05 .01 
4. SDO     
   affect             .16 1.45 .15 — 
   Arousal           –.01          –0.11 .91 — 
   difficulty             .21 1.86 .06 .01 
   preference             .32 3.56 < .001 .03 
Note. df = 287. Standardized regression coefficients in bold are significant at p < .05. Squared semipartial 
correlation coefficients were calculated only for regression coefficients with a p < .10. 
 
difficulty, and preference for binding foundations. In fact, unlike general ideology and 
cultural conservatism, the interaction between trade-off type and RWA in the omnibus 
MANOVA was significant (Roy’s Largest Root = .04), F(4, 285) = 2.90, p = .02. 




F(2,287) = 2.47, p = .09, η2 = .02, and a significant interaction for arousal, F(2, 287) = 
5.49, p < .01, η2 = .03. 
Whereas cultural conservatism was positively associated with all responses to 
INDV vs. BIND trade-offs except negative affect, economic conservatism was 
positively associated with negative affect only. Interestingly, economic conservatism 
was positively associated with negative affect, β = .17, t(289) = 2.91, p < .01, sr2 = .03, 
and arousal, β = .13, t(289) = 2.38, p = .02, sr2 = .02, regardless of trade-off type. SDO 
fared slightly better, as it was positively associated with both decision difficulty and 
preference for binding foundations in INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 tested three general hypotheses. First, it was predicted that because of 
their greater endorsement of binding foundations, participants who are more 
conservative would be more likely than participants who are more liberal to view INDV 
vs. BIND or BIND vs. BIND trade-offs as tragic trade-offs between two moral values 
and thus experience greater levels of negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty 
when contemplating these trade-offs. As both liberals and conservatives endorse 
individualizing foundations, no associations were predicted for INDV vs. INDV trade-
offs. Second, ideology should not be associated with preference for a particular option 
in INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, and there should be no overall 
preference for any particular option. For INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, however, 
participants who are more liberal were predicted to prefer the option endorsing 
individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives were predicted to either show no 




INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, but not the remaining trade-off types, were predicted to at 
least partially mediate any association between ideology and attitudes toward various 
contemporary social issues (same-sex marriage, the war in Iraq, abortion, and public 
health care reform). 
 The first hypothesis was supported for INDV vs. INDV and INDV vs. BIND 
trade-offs. Despite the lack of an interaction between ideology and trade-off type in the 
omnibus analysis, planned simple slopes analyses revealed that all participants 
experienced similar levels of negative affect, arousal, or decision difficulty for INDV 
vs. INDV trade-offs regardless of political ideology. Furthermore, all participants 
experienced relatively higher levels of these variables for INDV vs. INDV trade-offs, 
suggesting that all participants did indeed view these trade-offs as tragic. For INDV vs. 
BIND trade-offs, however, participants experienced greater levels of all three variables 
as they became more conservative. In other words, these trade-offs were more akin to 
tragic trade-offs of two sacred values for conservatives and more akin to taboo trade-
offs for liberals. However, results for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs did not support the 
first hypothesis. Political ideology was not associated with negative affect, arousal, or 
decision difficulty for these trade-offs. Thus, liberals and conservatives did not differ in 
the way they perceived BIND vs. BIND trade-offs. 
 The second hypothesis also received partial support. Ideological differences in 
decision preference were observed only for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. Even though all 
participants generally preferred the individualizing option, more conservative 
participants were less definite in their support than participants who were more liberal. 




BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, although exploratory follow-up analyses suggested that 
conservatives were more likely to display a preference for endorsing the 
Fairness/reciprocity foundation when it was traded-off against the Harm/care 
foundation. However, the second hypothesis also predicted that there would be no 
preference for any particular option in INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs 
and no preference (or a preference towards binding foundations) for conservatives in 
INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. This prediction was not supported. As stated earlier, even 
conservatives preferred the individualizing foundations in INDV vs. BIND trade-offs 
(albeit to a lesser extent than liberals). Both liberals and conservatives also displayed a 
decision preference for INDV vs. INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs. However, with 
the exception of the aforementioned preference for the Fairness/reciprocity foundation, 
there was no clear interpretation of these preferences other than a bias for the second 
option. 
 Finally, the third hypothesis received little support. Political ideology was 
indeed associated with attitudes toward contemporary social issues (conservatives had 
more favorable attitudes toward the war in Iraq and less favorable attitudes toward 
same-sex marriage, abortion, and health care reform), and these associations were not 
mediated by responses to non-INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. There was also little evidence 
of mediation by responses to INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. Relative to more liberal 
participants, more conservative participants were indeed more likely to prefer the option 
endorsing binding foundations in INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, and in turn, preference for 
this option was associated with less support for same-sex marriage and health care 




greater arousal for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs, which led to less support for same-sex 
marriage). However, even in these instances, the indirect effects remained extremely 
small and did not reduce the magnitude of the direct effects. 
 Although political ideology (i.e., liberal versus conservative) is commonly 
measured as a uni-dimensional construct, several researchers have argued that ideology 
is best conceptualized as a bi-dimensional construct comprising two distinct but related 
types of conservatism: economic and cultural (e.g., Crowson, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009; Eysecnk, 1954; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003). Thus, all analyses were re-run 
using both measures of economic and cultural conservatism and abbreviated measures 
of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), 
which are not identical to, but conceptually similar to economic and cultural 
conservatism, respectively (Jost, 2003; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; van Hiel, et al., 
2004). Thus, several exploratory analyses were also performed using measures of 
cultural conservatism, economic conservatism, RWA, and SDO instead of the 
unidimensional measure of political ideology. Economic conservatism and SDO only 
predicted differences in negative affect (economic conservatism) and preference for 
binding foundations (SDO) with respect to INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. Cultural 
conservatism and RWA fared better, with cultural conservatism predicting all response 
variables except negative affect, and RWA predicting all four responses variables.  
 There were several reasons that might help explain why the hypotheses were not 
supported for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs specifically and for the third hypothesis more 
generally. First, political ideology was somewhat positively skewed (i.e., there was a 




“5” or greater on a 7-point scale). The reduced power from this selection bias could 
partly explain why the associations between ideology and the dependent variable were 
not stronger for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs and non-existent for BIND vs. BIND trade-
offs.   
 Pilot testing of the trade-off scenarios suggests another possible reason why the 
hypotheses were not supported for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs and for the mediation 
analyses. Within the BIND vs. BIND scenarios, only one option within each scenario 
was reported as endorsing binding foundations to a greater extent than individualizing 
foundations. The remaining options were reported as having no difference in 
endorsement between individualizing and binding foundations or actually endorsing 
individualizing foundations to a greater extent than binding foundations. Furthermore 
the average discrepancy between individualizing and binding foundations within each 
option was not as large (0.70 points on a 7 point scale) for BIND vs. BIND trade-offs as 
it was for IND vs. BIND trade-offs (1.84 points). Thus, not only did several of the 
options not endorse the appropriate foundations, but also the foundations were not as 
clearly distinguished within each option as they were for INDV vs. BIND trade-offs. If 
these scenarios did indeed include elements of individualizing foundations, then it 
would not be surprising that no ideological differences were found.  
Additionally, all of these scenarios were complex and relatively realistic. Thus, 
it is extremely likely that other factors besides the moral foundations were embedded in 
the scenario. For example, in the scenarios involving making a hiring decision, a 
participant could also consider consequences to the self (e.g., “will a certain decision 




moral foundations, could also have influenced negative affect, arousal, etc., they could 
have in turn diluted the associations between ideology and the dependent variables, and 
between the dependent variables and the attitudes toward same-sex marriage, etc. 
Follow-up research could address this issue by simplifying the measurement of 
foundation preference. Instead of asking participants to make judgments about complex 
scenarios, they could instead be asked more directly to choose which foundations are 
more important to them (e.g., Graham, 2010, Study 2). Although it is unlikely that such 
a decision would be involving enough to induce differences in negative affect or 
arousal, differences in decision difficulty or preference at least should be more precise.  
For Study 2, however, the design was instead simplified by dropping INDV vs. 
INDV and BIND vs. BIND trade-offs, as the INDV vs. BIND trade-offs were of the 
most interest within the context of the current investigation of cross-foundational moral 
trade-offs. The attitudes toward contemporary social issues and subsequent mediation 
analyses were also excluded. 
Study 2 
 Study 1 provided support to the hypotheses that political ideology is associated 
with the perception of trade-offs between individualizing and binding moral 
foundations. As predicted, a preference for upholding values pertaining to 
individualizing foundations at the expense of values pertaining to binding foundations 
became less definite as participants became more conservative. Furthermore, as 
predicted by the SVPM, participants who were more conservative viewed these trade-
offs as eliciting more negative affect and arousal and being more difficult than 




characteristic of tragic trade-offs for more conservative participants than for more 
liberal participants. Study 2 differed from and extended Study 1 in two primary ways. 
First, only INDV vs. BIND trade-offs were examined. Second, some participants were 
given the opportunity to credential themselves on different moral foundations prior to 
considering the trade-offs. 
 Moral credentialing refers to establishing one’s qualities as a moral or virtuous 
person, which can then act as a rationalization tool for future misdeeds. Monin and 
Miller (2001) first demonstrated moral credentialing by asking male participants to 
consider potential applicants for a stereotypically male job after giving them the 
opportunity to disagree with overtly sexist statements. Men who had this opportunity to 
demonstrate their commitment to egalitarianism then became more likely to rate a male 
as better suited to this particular job than a female. Additionally, White males were 
more likely to prefer other White males over other candidates for a hypothetical job 
opening after first having the opportunity to hire a highly-qualified female or African-
American applicant. 
 Previous research has suggested that moral credentialing can facilitate a variety 
of selfish or unethical behaviors, such as purchasing luxury items (Khan & Dhar, 2006), 
cheating in ambiguous circumstances (Brown et al., 2011), and covert racism (Effron, 
Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001). In all of these studies, the specific 
values participants credentialed themselves on corresponded primarily with 
individualizing foundations. Because conservatives value binding foundations to a 
greater extent than liberals do, it should be possible for conservatives to also credential 




given the opportunity to establish their adherence to a foundation they personally value 
beforehand, they should be less likely to experience negative affect, arousal, and 
decision difficulty when contemplating a trade-off involving that foundation, as they 
had already demonstrated their commitment to it.  
Therefore, as in Study 1, when participants do not have the opportunity to 
engage in moral credentialing, conservatives should experience greater negative affect 
and report greater decision difficulty than liberals should when contemplating 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs, suggesting that liberals perceive these trade-
offs as relatively taboo, and conservatives perceive these trade-offs as relatively tragic. 
The effects of the moral credentialing manipulation, on the other hand, should depend 
on which foundations participants credential themselves. When participants credential 
themselves on individualizing foundations, the effect of credentialing on negative 
affect, arousal, and decision difficulty should be moderated by political ideology. 
Although both tragic and taboo-trade-offs elicit some degree of negative affect and 
arousal, tragic trade-offs do so to a greater degree than do taboo trade-offs (Tetlock et 
al., 2000), and decisions in taboo trade-offs are viewed as not any more difficult, or 
even less difficult, than routine trade-offs (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). Thus, whereas 
both liberals and conservatives might experience an overall reduction for negative affect 
and arousal, conservatives will experience greater reductions than liberals will. 
Furthermore, decision difficulty following credentialing should only decrease for 
conservatives. 
Hypothesis 4: Relative to control participants, participants who credential 




negative affect and arousal when they are forced to make individualizing versus 
binding trade-offs, and this effect should be moderated by political ideology, 
such that greater reductions are associated with increasing conservatism. 
Decision difficulty should decrease for conservatives only. 
 As opposed to individualizing foundations, allowing participants to credential 
themselves on binding foundations should only affect conservatives’ reactions to 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs. Because liberals view binding foundations as 
relatively less important to their moral belief system than do conservatives, affirming 
binding foundations should likely be insufficient as a form of moral credentialing for 
liberals (e.g., Steele, 1988) and thus not influence their levels of negative affect, 
arousal, and decision difficulty.  However, because conservatives place greater value on 
binding foundations, negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty should decrease for 
conservatives when they are able to credential themselves on binding foundations. 
Hypothesis 5: Relative to control participants, participants who credential 
themselves on binding foundations should experience a reduction in negative 
affect, arousal, and decision difficulty for individualizing versus binding trade-
offs. This effect should be moderated by political ideology, such that greater 
reductions in negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty are associated with 
higher levels of conservatism. 
 For decision preference, the effect of moral credentialing should again differ 
with respect to political ideology. As conservatives are more likely to have no clear 
preference between the options (for this represents a tragic trade-off), credentialing 




corresponding to the binding foundations, as the moral credentialing manipulation gave 
them the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to individualizing foundations. 
Likewise, giving conservative participants the opportunity to credential themselves on 
binding foundations should shift their preference to the option corresponding to the 
individualizing foundations. For liberals, however, credentialing themselves on either 
individualizing foundations or binding foundations should make them unlikely to shift 
their preference to the binding option, as not choosing the binding option is unlikely to 
be perceived as a threat to their moral self. 
Hypothesis 6a: The effect on decision preference of credentialing participants on 
individualizing foundations will be moderated by political ideology for 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs. Conservatives will be more likely to 
shift from no preference to a preference for the binding option, whereas liberals 
will not shift their preference (i.e., they will still prefer the individualizing 
option). 
Hypothesis 6b: The effect on decision preference of credentialing participants on 
binding foundations will be moderated by political ideology for individualizing 
versus binding trade-offs. Conservatives will be more likely to shift from no 
preference to a preference for the individualizing option, whereas liberals will 
not shift their preference (i.e., they will prefer the individualizing option). 
As in Study 1, participants will also complete measures of economic 
conservatism, cultural conservatism, RWA, and SDO. Again, these measures were 







 Participants were 461 individuals recruited using Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (Mturk). As in Study 1, participation in this study was restricted to those with an 
IP address from within the United States. Twenty-eight participants were excluded from 
all analyses because they completed all questionnaires in less than five minutes, and an 
additional 15 were excluded because they were not United States citizens. Finally, 38 
participants were excluded for failing the manipulation check.2 Of the remaining 380 
participants, 152 were male (225 female; 3 did not specify) with an average age of 
33.71 years (SD = 12.45 years; Min = 18 years; Max = 74 years). The majority of 
participants were White (76.3%; Black, 7.6%; Asian, 6.1%; Hispanic, 2.9%; Other, 
7.1%), and Christian (63.3%; Atheist/Agnostic, 27.6%; Jewish, 2.4%; Buddhist, 1.3%; 
Muslim, 1.1%; Other, 4.3%). Finally, participants were also diverse concerning their 
highest level of education (Did not finish High School, 0.8%; High School 
Diploma/GED, 34.5%; Associate’s Degree, 19.2%; Bachelor’s Degree, 32.6%; 
Graduate Degree, 12.9%) and yearly income (under $20,000, 33.3%; $20,000 - 
$39,000, 29.4%; $40,000 - $59,000, 16.1%; $60,000 - $79,000, 9.5%; $80,000 - 
$99,000, 5.8%; $100,000 - $999,999, 5.0%; over $1,000,000, 0.8%; 0.5% did not 
respond). All participants were compensated $.25 for their participation in this study.  
 
2. Participants in the control conditions were asked to list all of the nouns and verbs for phrases 
representing violations of either individualizing or binding foundations. Twenty-two individuals were 
excluded for not following instructions (i.e., failing to identify at least one noun and verb for each phrase. 
Participants in the experimental conditions were asked to rate the likelihood they would violate behaviors 
associated with either foundation for $100. As moral credentialing depends on participants stating they 
would not perform the behavior, 16 participants were excluded if they had a mean greater than or equal to 





 Reactions to moral trade-offs, political ideology, RWA, and SDO were identical 
to those used in Study 1. The average reliability of the negative affect measure was 
again good (α = .83). As with Study 1, one item was excluded from both the measures 
of arousal and decision difficulty to produce four-item measures of each (average α = 
.74 for arousal and α = .83 for decision difficulty). The reliabilities for RWA and SDO 
were also acceptable (α = .77 and α = .75, respectively). The measure of attitudes 
toward contemporary social issues was not included in this study. 
Procedure 
 Participants followed the same basic procedure as in Study 1 with two 
exceptions. After following the MTurk link to the study hosted on Qualtrics and 
providing their consent for participation, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions of the moral credentialing manipulation (Appendix G): individualizing 
experimental, binding experimental, individualizing control, and binding control. 
 In both experimental conditions, participants completed a modified version of 
the measure of taboo trade-offs used in Graham et al. (2009, Study 3). Participants were 
asked to imagine they were anonymously and secretly offered $100 to perform several 
behaviors that violated either individualizing or binding foundations. For each behavior, 
they indicated how likely they would be to perform the behavior using a Likert scale 
anchored by 1 (“very unlikely”) and 7 (“very likely”). For the individualizing 
experimental condition, participant rated the likelihood of performing six behaviors that 
represented violations of the individualizing foundations (e.g., “kick a dog in the head, 
hard” and “steal money from a poor person to buy a gift from a rich person”). For the 




behaviors that represented violations of the binding foundations (e.g., “curse your 
parents to their face” and “cook and eat your dog after it dies of natural causes”). The 
value of $100 was chosen because although this equates to a non-trivial sum of money 
for most individuals, it was lower than the mean minimum amount required for any 
group to violate any foundation reported in Graham et al. (2009). Thus, the vast 
majority of participants should report being relatively unlikely to perform the given 
behaviors, despite at least a modest temptation to do so, allowing them to credential 
themselves on the corresponding foundations. 
 In the control conditions, participants read the same behaviors given in the 
experimental conditions (i.e., six individualizing violations or six binding violations). 
However, instead of being asked if they would perform the behaviors for $100, they 
were merely asked to read each phrase and separately report each word that can be 
classified as either a noun or a verb.  
 After completing the moral credentialing manipulation, participants then 
responded to three scenarios representing trade-offs between individualizing and 
binding foundations. The trade-offs and subsequent measures of negative affect, 
arousal, and decision difficulty were identical to those used in Study 1. Participants then 
completed the brief measures of RWA and SDO (a measure of attitudes toward 
contemporary social issues was not included in this study), which were presented in 









 Before conducting the primary analyses, I tested whether the extent to which 
participants credentialed themselves was dependent on which foundation they 
credentialed and their ideology. Overall, participants were relatively unwilling to violate 
any of the foundations for $100 (M = 1.82; SD = 0.85). However, participants were 
generally more unwilling to violate individualizing (M = 1.69; SD = 0.82) than binding 
foundations (M = 1.97; SD = 0.86), F(1, 208) = 4.61, p = .03, μ2 = 0.02. More 
importantly, political ideology was not associated with moral credentialing, F(1, 208) < 
1, ns, nor did it interact with foundation type, F(1, 208) = 1.36, p = .25. 
Omnibus Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all political ideology items 
(general, cultural, and economic), RWA, and SDO can be found in Table 5. As in Study 
1, the dependent variables (negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and decision 
preference) were first subjected to an omnibus one-way MANOVA with moral 
credentialing as a fixed factor (INDV credentialing vs. BIND credentialing vs. INDV 
control vs. BIND control) and political ideology as a covariate that also was allowed to 
interact with the credentialing variable. There was no significant interaction between 
ideology and moral credentialing (Roy’s Largest Root = .01), F(4, 384) < 1, ns. In 
addition, there was no main effect of moral credentialing (Roy’s Largest Root = .01), 
F(4, 384) = 1.18, p = .32. However, ideology was associated with the dependent 
variables (Roy’s Largest Root = .03), F(4, 382) = 2.47, p = .04. Results were similar for 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Political Ideology Items (General, Cultural, 
and Economic Conservatism), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO).  
 1 2 3 4 5 M SD 
1. general —        3.28 1.74 
2. cultural .59 —       2.97 1.90 
3. economic .65 .40 —      3.89 1.79 
4. RWA .59 .67 .40 —   –1.82 1.93 
5. SDO .43 .35 .41 .40 —    2.42 1.19 
Note. All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
 
Trace) as well. Follow-up regression analyses with each dependent variable on 
ideology, moral credentialing, and their interaction revealed that this association was 
driven by an increased preference for binding foundations for more conservative 
participants, β = .24, t(371) = 2.34, p = .02, sr2 = .02. Ideology did not predict any of the 
other dependent variables (all other βs < .07, ns).  
 As in Study 1, because the omnibus MANOVA found no interaction between 
ideology and moral credentialing, further analyses were planned contrasts  
specifically testing hypotheses four through six. In order to test these hypotheses, the 
moral credentialing variable was recoded using a matrix of three orthogonal contrasts. 
The first contrast compared the INDV credentialing condition to the two control 
conditions. The second contrast compared the BIND condition to the two control 
conditions. Finally, the third contrast compared the control conditions to each other. 




interaction between ideology and each contrast. All continuous variables were 
standardized prior to the analysis. 
Negative Affect, Arousal, and Decision Difficulty 
 The contrast testing the equality of participants’ psychological responses to 
INDV vs. BIND trade-offs across both control conditions was not significant for 
negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty, all ts < 1.02, ns. Thus, the contrasts 
testing either INDV credentialing or BIND credentialing against both control conditions 
was justified.  
 Hypothesis four predicted that after participants credential themselves on 
individualizing foundations, negative affect and arousal would decrease compared to 
the control conditions, and that the decrease would be greater for conservatives. 
However, none of the interaction terms between ideology and the first moral 
credentialing contrast were significant for any of the dependent variables, all ts < |1|, ns. 
Furthermore, regardless of ideology, negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty 
were no different when participants credentialed themselves on individualizing 
foundations compared to the control conditions, β = –.11, taffect(371) = –1.29, p = .20, all 
other ts < |1|, ns. (Table 6). Thus, credentialing participants on individualizing 
foundations appeared to have no effect on the psychological experience of INDV vs. 
BIND trade-offs and provided no support for hypothesis four. 
 Hypothesis five predicted that after participants credential themselves on 
binding foundations, negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty would decrease 
compared to the control conditions for conservatives only and not for liberals. As with 





Means and Standard Deviations of Negative Affect, Arousal, Decision Difficulty, and 
Decision Preference as a Function of the Moral Credentialing of Individualizing 
(INDV) or Binding (BIND) Foundations. 







  M SD M SD M SD 
Negative Affect 4.09 0.98 4.18 0.97 4.27 0.98 
Arousal 4.45 0.94 4.59 0.85 4.53 0.88 
Decision Difficulty 3.56 1.01 3.77 1.08 3.55 0.97 
Decision Preference  –1.12 1.38  –1.28 1.19  –1.31 1.22 
Note. Means and standard deviations for controls are collapsed across individualizing and binding control 
conditions. 
 
contrast variable were significant, all ts < |1|, ns. Furthermore, participants in the BIND 
credentialing condition did not significantly differ in their levels of negative affect and 
arousal compared to the control conditions, ts < |1|, ns. The difference for decision 
difficulty, however, approached significance, β = .17, t(371) = 1.86, p = .07,  = .21. sr2 
= .01. However, the direction of this effect was the opposite of what was predicted, as 
both liberals and conservatives reported greater decision difficulty after credentialing 
themselves on binding foundations compared to the control conditions.3 
Decision Preference 
 Hypothesis six stated that conservatives should shift their decision preference 
towards whichever foundation type they did not credential themselves on as opposed to 
having no overall decision preference in the control condition. Liberals, on the other  
3. Analyses were also run testing the individualizing conditions (experimental and control) against each 





hand, should not shift their decision preference regardless of condition, as they already 
prefer individualizing over binding foundations. The interaction term between ideology 
and the first contrast comparing the INDV credentialing condition versus the control 
conditions was not significant, β = –.11, t(371) = –1.37, p = .17. The same was true for 
the interaction term between ideology and the second contrast comparing the BIND 
credentialing condition versus the two control conditions, β = –.11, t(371) = 1.24, p = 
.22. In addition, neither the INDV nor BIND condition had any overall effect on 
decision preference compared to the two control conditions, β = .11, tINDV(371) = 1.35, 
p =.17, and β = –.01, tBIND(371) < 1, ns. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Just as in Study 1, the primary analyses were re-run using measures of cultural 
conservatism, economic conservatism, RWA, and SDO instead over general political 
ideology to explore the pattern of results if ideology is conceptualized as a two-
dimensional construct. Like the analysis for general political ideology, cultural 
conservatism did not significantly interact with any of the interaction terms for any of 
the dependent variables. However, RWA did significantly interact with the first contrast 
statement (INDV credentialing vs. controls) for decision preference, β = .18, t(372) = 
2.24, p = .03, sr2 = .01. Two follow-up analyses were performed by re-running the 
regression analyses after transforming RWA scores twice: once so that a score of zero 
represented 1 SD above and then again so that a score of zero represented 1 SD below 
the mean. Thus, each contrast main effect became an estimate of the effect of INDV 
credentialing compared to the controls and 1 SD above and 1 SD below the mean of 




did not shift their decision preference after credentialing themselves on individualizing 
foundations compared to control conditions, β = –.08, t(372) < 1, ns (Figure 3). 
Participants relatively high in RWA (1 SD above then mean) were more likely to shift 
their preference towards the option endorsing the binding foundation after credentialing 
themselves on individualizing foundations compared to the control conditions, β = .28, 
t(372) = 2.42, p = .02, sr2 = .01, although all participants still overwhelmingly preferred 
the option endorsing individualizing foundations.  
Whereas RWA interacted with the first contrast statement, economic 
conservatism and SDO interacted with second contrast statement (BIND credentialing 




Figure 3. Decision preference as a function of Right-Wing Authorianism (RWA) and moral credentialing. 
INDV = Individualizing credentialing condition. Controls = both individualizing and binding control 































vs. both controls) on several of the dependent variables. Specifically, economic 
conservatism interacted with the second contrast statement to predict negative affect, β 
= –.19, t(371) = –2.16, p = .03, sr2 = .01. SDO not only interacted with the second 
contrast statement to again predict negative affect, β = –.20, t(372) = –2.18, p = .03, sr2 
= .01, but also predicted decision difficulty, β = –.17, t(372) = –1.92, p = .06, sr2 = .01. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that participants who scored relatively low on the 
measures of economic conservatism and SDO did not differ in their levels of negative 
effect after credentialing themselves on binding foundations compared to the control 
conditions, β = .16, t(371) = –1.35, p = .18, for economic conservatism and β = .17, 
t(372) = –1.39, p = .17, for SDO (Figure 4). Participants who scored relatively high on 
economic conservatism and SDO displayed lower levels of negative affect when they 
credentialed themselves on binding foundations compared to control conditions, β = –
.22, t(371) = –1.71, p = .09, sr2 = .01, for economic conservatism and β = –.22, t(372) = 
–1.71, p = .09, sr2 = .01, for SDO. The interaction for decision difficulty, however, was 
counterintuitive considering the positive association SDO typically has with 
conservatism. Participants low in SDO experienced lower decision difficulty after 
credentialing themselves on binding foundations compared to controls, β = .32, t(372) = 
2.64, p = .01, sr2 = .02. Participants high in SDO did not differ in their reported levels 
of decision difficulty, β = –.02, t(372) < |1|, ns. 
Replication of Study 1 
 The last analysis was an attempt to replicate the results of Study 1. Because 
moral credentialing only seemed to have sporadic effects, scores on all dependent 










Figure 4. Negative affect as a function of economic conservatism and moral credentialing (A) and of 
SDO and the moral credentialing of binding (BIND) foundations (B). Decision difficulty as a function of 







































































political ideology. Ideology was not significantly associated with negative affect, 
arousal, or decision difficulty, all ts < |1.1|, ns. However, the positive association 
between ideology and decision preference (i.e., greater conservatism predicted a greater 
preference for binding over individualizing foundations) did replicate, β = .13, t(377) = 
2.49, p = .01, sr2 = .02. Because the associations between RWA and the dependent 
variables were the same but stronger than with ideology in Study 1, the regression 
analyses were run again using RWA as a predictor. RWA was not associated with 
negative affect, β = .07, t(378) = 1.44, p = .15. However, RWA was positively 
associated with arousal, β = .10, t(378) = 2.03, p = .04, sr2 = .01, decision difficulty, β = 
.19, t(377) = 3.82, p < .001, sr2 = .04, and decision preference, β = .24, t(377) = 4.80, p 
< .001, sr2 = .06. 
Discussion 
 Based on the results of Study 1, Study 2 predicted that the opportunity to 
demonstrate participants’ commitment to either individualizing or binding foundations 
(i.e., moral credentialing) should differentially affect liberals’ and conservatives’ 
reactions to trade-offs between individualizing and binding foundations. Because 
liberals consider individualizing foundations to be relatively more morally important 
than binding foundations, credentialing themselves on individualizing foundations, but 
not binding foundations, should reduce any negative affect or arousal they experience 
while contemplating individualizing versus binding trade-offs. Decision difficulty and 
decision preference should not be affected, as liberals should already heavily favor the 
option endorsing individualizing foundations. Because conservatives value both 




sufficient to reduce negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty. Furthermore, 
because conservatives should be relatively ambivalent in their decision preference, 
those who engaged in moral credentialing should shift their preference towards 
whichever foundation they did not credential themselves. For example, conservatives 
who credentialed themselves on binding foundations should shift their preference 
towards the option endorsing individualizing foundations. 
 Overall, these hypotheses were not supported. Compared to control conditions, 
participants did not show any reduction in negative affect, arousal, or decision difficulty 
after credentialing themselves on individualizing foundations regardless of whether they 
were liberal or conservative. Furthermore, although liberals did not show a reduction in 
negative affect, arousal, or difficulty after credentialing themselves on binding 
foundations as predicted, conservatives did not show reductions in these variables 
either. The only effect that approached significance was the effect of the contrast 
comparing the decision difficulty of participants who credentialed themselves on 
binding foundations to both control conditions. Participants who credentialed 
themselves reported greater decision difficulty than did those in the control condition. 
However, because this effect was unexpected and not consistent with the other 
dependent variables (e.g., negative affect and arousal), it should be interpreted with 
caution. The decision preference of liberals was again not affected by the moral 
credentialing manipulation as predicted, but neither was the decision preference of 
conservatives. 
 As in Study 1, all primary analyses were re-run using measures of cultural and 




the measures of cultural and economic conservatism did not interact with moral 
credentialing, RWA and SDO did so inconsistently. After stating they would not 
perform various behaviors that violated this foundations for 100 dollars (i.e., 
credentialing), participants who were relatively high in RWA (i.e., more conservative) 
were less likely to prefer the option endorsing individualizing foundations in 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs than control participants who simply read the 
behaviors and reported all the nouns and verbs in the phrase. Participants relatively low 
in RWA (i.e., more liberal), however, did not shift their preference, as they always 
preferred the option endorsing individualizing foundations. This finding is consistent 
with hypothesis six, as when participants who were relatively more conservative 
credentialed themselves on individualizing foundations, this should free them to 
endorse the option endorsing the binding foundations, as they had already established 
their commitment to individualizing foundations. More liberal participants, on the other 
hand, did not shift their preference after credentialing themselves on the same 
foundations, as they presumably do not value binding foundations as much as 
individualizing foundations.  
 Participants who credentialed themselves on binding foundations, on the other 
hand, experienced differential effects on their levels of negative affect and decision 
difficulty compared to control conditions that was dependent on their level of SDO. 
Participants relatively high in SDO (and also economic conservatism) experienced a 
decrease in negative affect after credentialing themselves on binding foundations. 
Participants relatively low in SDO (and economic conservatism) did not differ in their 




finding is consistent with hypothesis five. As binding foundations are relatively more 
valued by more conservative participants, affirming a commitment to binding 
foundations should reduce any discomfort elicited by the trade-off for these participants 
only. However, the effects on decision difficulty were not consistent with any 
hypothesis. Difficulty was no different for participants relatively high in SDO. For 
participants relatively low in SDO, participants actually reported greater levels of 
decision difficulty after credentialing themselves on binding foundations. Because this 
interaction was not predicted a priori and was not consistent across the dependent 
variables (i.e., it only occurred for decision difficulty and not for negative affect or 
arousal), these results should be interpreted with caution. 
 There are several possible reasons why the main hypotheses were not supported. 
First, the distribution of political ideology was once again positively skewed. As in 
Study 1, only 20% of participants identified as conservative (i.e., “5” or greater on a 7-
point scale). The majority of the effects were predicted to occur among conservatives, 
and the primary hypotheses involved interactions between ideology and moral 
credentialing. Thus, the lack of conservatives in this study substantially reduced the 
power to detect any significant effects of moral credentialing. 
Second, participants might have engaged in some moral credentialing even in 
the control conditions. Participants were exposed to the same behaviors as in the 
credentialing conditions, but were asked to list all of the nouns and verbs in the phrase 
rather than report on how likely they would be to perform the behavior. This was done 
to control for the effects of exposure to binding and individualizing foundations and 




conditions still had to process the behaviors semantically, it is possible that these 
participants could have spontaneously credentialed themselves on the respective 
foundations, particularly on some of the more egregious violations (“That is so wrong. I 
would never do something like that!”), negating any effects of moral credentialing. 
 In the same vein, it is possible that the credentialing conditions did not 
successfully elicit moral credentialing. Although the vast majority of participants stated 
they would not perform violations of individualizing or binding foundations for $100, 
this may have not been a sufficient amount to make participants feel that they had 
successfully resisted temptation and affirmed their moral identity. Previous research has 
shown that acting against self-interest is not a necessary component of moral 
credentialing (Effron et al., 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001), and merely imagining 
behaving morally is sufficient to induce credentialing (Brown et al., 2011; Sachdeva, 
Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Together, this suggests that stating that violating a moral 
foundation for $100 would be very unlikely should be sufficient to enable the 
credentialing of that foundation.  
 Finally, the success of the manipulations was dependent on the participants’ 
ability and willingness to engage themselves in the survey. Participants were recruited 
via Mturk rather than an undergraduate psychology pool because the ideological 
orientation of college freshmen and sophomores is likely not as stable as an older, 
national sample (Sears, 1986). However, Mturk participants, as with participants in any 
online study, are likely less motivated than undergraduates to take the study seriously. 
For example, participants in the control conditions were instructed to list all of the 




successfully identified each noun and each verb, and many only listed only one of each. 
Assuming that participants were equally unengaged in the experimental condition, this 
would explain the lack of credentialing effects. As stated earlier, imagining oneself 
behaving morally is enough to induce moral credentialing. However, if there is no 
imagination in the first place, then credentialing is unlikely to occur. 
 Follow-up studies can address these issues in several ways. First, alternative 
methods of sampling can be considered to reduce the skew for political ideology. For 
example, participants can be pre-selected based on their previously reported political 
ideology (or party identification). Additionally, the moral credentialing manipulation 
should be modified to make both the control conditions less likely to spontaneously 
induce moral credentialing and all conditions more engaging. With respect to the 
control conditions, participants could be exposed to more abstract representations of 
individualizing and binding foundations rather than the concrete violations in this study. 
The issue of engagement may partly be due to sampling and compensation issues. 
However, the credentialing manipulation may itself be made more engaging by making 
it more self-relevant. For example, participants could imagine a detailed scenario in 
which they can refuse to violate one of the foundations (Brown et al., 2011), or they 
could write about a past life event where they demonstrated their commitment to 
individualizing or binding foundations (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). 
General Discussion 
 A common characteristic of many ideological differences on contemporary 
social and cultural issues in the United States of America (e.g., same-sex marriage) is 




position (Haidt & Graham, 2007). MFT attempts to explain this “culture clash” through 
the lens of moral relativism (Graham et al., 2009). All individuals value individualizing 
foundations (Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity). However, conservatives, unlike 
liberals, place a relatively higher moral importance on binding foundations 
(ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity). Therefore, when conservatives 
argue for upholding binding foundations, liberals may view conservatives as immoral 
because they are seemingly ignoring individualizing foundations, the only values that 
“really matter.” Likewise, conservatives may view liberals who argue solely on 
individualizing foundations immoral because they seemingly lack a concern for binding 
foundations. 
 Although many real-life decisions, such as deciding whether to support same-
sex marriage, draw on multiple foundations (e.g., Fairness/reciprocity or 
Purity/sanctity), much of the previous research on MFT has examined the foundations 
independently of one another. The current studies expanded research on MFT by 
examining the responses of individuals to complex and realistic dilemmas that asked 
participants to trade off between individualizing and/or binding foundations. According 
to the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM; e,g., Tetlock et al., 2000), people find 
trade-offs between sacred (e.g., moral) values uncomfortable and difficult, while trade-
offs between a sacred and a routine (e.g., non-moral) value are not as difficult to make 
but taboo to consider. 
 Thus, if ideology is associated with perceiving certain foundations as morally 
relevant (i.e., sacred), then how an individual perceives a trade-off between 




provided some support for this hypothesis. Although ideology was not associated with 
levels of negative affect, arousal, and difficulty making a decision for trade-offs 
involving only individualizing foundations (consistent with hypotheses) and for trade-
offs involving only binding foundations (inconsistent with hypotheses), ideology was 
associated with these variables for trade-offs involving individualizing and binding 
foundations. Specifically, relatively conservative participants were more likely than 
relatively liberal participants to perceive these trade-offs as tragic (two sacred values) 
rather than taboo (one sacred and one routine value). As such, conservative participants 
experienced higher levels of negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty than did 
more liberal participants. More conservative participants were also less likely to clearly 
prefer the option endorsing individualizing foundations over the option endorsing 
binding foundations, which is consistent with the idea that conservatives value both sets 
of foundations relatively equally, at least more so than liberals. 
 Study 2 attempted to extend MFT further by exploring the motivational aspects 
of moral trade-offs. At least part of the discomfort experienced by participants is 
presumably due to their desire to behave consistently with their moral values (rendered 
impossible in a tragic trade-off; Aronson, E., 1968; Tetlock et al., 2000). Therefore, 
allowing participants to credential themselves on the foundations they value 
(individualizing foundations for liberals and both individualizing and binding 
foundations for conservatives) should alleviate this discomfort and facilitate decision-
making by buffering the moral self-concept (Sachdeva et al., 2009). However, this is 




experience of individualizing versus binding trade-offs or the actual decision for these 
trade-offs. 
Implications 
  When it comes to social policy issues such as same-sex marriage or health care 
reform, it is not uncommon for supporters of these issues (who are generally liberal) to 
characterize opponents (who are generally conservative) as uncaring, selfish, or even 
bigoted. For example, political commentator Keith Olbermann once described an Elder 
of the Mormon Church as one of the “Worst Persons in the World” for defending the 
involvement of the Mormon Church in the California proposition that sought to ban 
same-sex marriage and advised him to “shut the hell up” (Olbermann, 2009). In a more 
extreme example, in a response to comments made by then U.S. Senator Rick Santorum 
(R-OH) regarding non-traditional sexual acts (e.g., homosexuality), sex advice 
columnist Dan Savage started a campaign to redefine the word “santorum” as an 
obscenity (Savage, 2003).  
 The associations between ideology and attitudes toward various contemporary 
social issues such as same-sex marriage were not mediated by participants’ responses to 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs. However, recent research has suggested that 
the endorsement of binding foundations (especially purity) is associated with 
disapproval of same-sex marriage and abortion (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 
2012). Furthermore, the positive associations between ideology and the dependent 
variables in Study 1 (negative affect, arousal, decision difficulty, and decision 
preference) suggest that when liberals and conservatives disagree on morally charged 




hearted are mistaken. In fact, it might be argued that conservatives even care about 
dilemmas involving individualizing foundations more than liberals do, as their broader 
moral belief system can make a dilemma involving both individualizing and binding 
foundations an arduous task, whereas for a liberal the same dilemma would not be given 
as much careful consideration. 
 These studies also have important theoretical implications. First, Study 1 
extends MFT by demonstrating that ideological differences persist when individualizing 
and binding foundations are brought into direct conflict with one another. Furthermore, 
these differences are not just with respect to relative preferences for individualizing or 
binding foundations. Rather, political ideology is associated with the psychological 
experience of these types of dilemmas. The greater levels of negative affect, arousal, 
and decision difficulty that conservatives experience while contemplating these types of 
trade-offs suggest that binding foundations are indeed “sacred” for conservatives, but 
not as much so for liberals. 
 These studies examined the intrapersonal aspects of cross-foundational trade-
offs with respect to political ideology. However, the SVPM also makes predictions 
regarding how an individual would respond to another person engaging in a moral 
trade-off. Specifically, merely contemplating a taboo trade-off (sacrificing a sacred 
value for a routine value) is sufficient to elicit outrage and condemnation of the 
(potential) actor and encourage a reaffirmation of one’s own moral identity (Tetlock et 
al., 2000). Because individualizing versus binding trade-offs are tragic for conservatives 




conservative will appear to a liberal to be a rationalized disregard for individualizing 
foundations, warranting outrage and sanctioning. 
 These two studies also have implications for models of conservatism as a form 
of motivated social cognition (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). These models posit that 
conservative ideology develops as a protective response to threats to security, social 
order, stability, etc. (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003). Because conservatives have a 
broader scope of sacred moral values, it is quite possible that conservatives encounter 
tragic trade-offs more often than do liberals and thus actually do see more events as 
threatening not only to their well-being but to their moral belief system. Furthermore, 
the endorsement of binding foundations could also serve as a mechanism to manage 
those same threats. Indeed, van Leeuwen and Park (2009) found that the tendency to 
place greater emphasis on binding foundations relative to individualizing foundations 
partially mediated the association between political ideology and the belief in a 
dangerous world. Additionally, experimentally induced threats have led to more 
favorable attitudes related to the binding foundations, such as authoritarian control, in-
group favoritism, and religiosity (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Vail et al., 2010; Voci, 2006). 
This suggests that the endorsement of binding foundations could simultaneously act as a 
source of threat in some contexts and as a mechanism to reduce threat in other contexts. 
There is already some research on the latter (e.g., van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), and 
Study 1 provides is consistent with the former. Future research should test more directly 





 Finally, in both studies, cultural conservatism and especially RWA were 
generally as good or better predictors of both the psychological reaction to 
individualizing versus binding trade-offs (negative affect, arousal, and decision 
difficulty) and a preference for the binding option over the individualizing option. 
Economic conservatism and SDO, on the other hand, were less consistently able to 
predict these variables. Political ideology is commonly measured by either asking 
participants their self-reported liberalism or conservatism on one or two items, as it was 
in the current studies, or by an aggregate of self-reported ideology and political party 
identification. However, research on economic and cultural conservatism (or on SDO 
and RWA) has shown that these two types of conservatism are relatively independent of 
one another and have unique psychological correlates (Crowson, 2009; Duckitt, 2001; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003; van Hiel et al., 2004).  
 The relation between political ideology and binding foundations appears to 
follow a similar distinction. Even though RWA and SDO were quite modestly 
correlated in both studies (r = .30 in Study 1 and r = .40 in Study 2), and both were 
correlated with general political ideology (rs ranging from .41 to .59), only RWA was 
significantly predictive of all four possible responses to individualizing versus binding 
trade-offs in Study 1 and of all of the responses except negative affect in Study 2. Thus, 
it appears that the conservative preference for binding foundations is especially driven 
by cultural conservatism or RWA. Like the research cited earlier, these findings call 
into question the utility of measuring political ideology as a single dimension 
(especially with a single item). Although measuring ideology in this manner is 




might share (e.g., ingroup favoritism; Duckitt, 2011), future research should take into 
consideration both economic and cultural conservatism when measuring political 
ideology. 
Limitations 
 Unlike many studies that use a convenience sample of psychology 
undergraduates, the current studies made use of a crowd-sourcing website (Mturk) 
powered by Amazon.com, Inc. Whereas college undergraduates are unlikely to have 
fully developed belief structures at their current stage of development (Sears, 1986), 
Mturk users are more representative of the general population than college samples in 
terms of demographic variables such as age and ethnicity (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). However, this apparent strength may also be a limitation. In both 
studies, the samples overwhelmingly consisted of participants who identified as either 
liberal or moderate. Thus, the regression models were based on distributions where 1 
SD above the mean of political ideology represents an individual who is only “slightly 
conservative” and 1 SD below the mean represents an individual who is between 
“moderately” and “strongly liberal.” As such, these findings may not necessarily 
generalize to individuals who strongly identify as conservative. However, studies that 
did not suffer from this issue show that endorsement of binding foundations increases 
linearly with increasing levels of conservatism (Graham et al., 2009).  
Although part of the reason for this “liberal bias” could be due to the method in 
which ideology was measured (i.e., a single-item), it is likely not the only reason. 
Across both studies, 229 potential respondents started but did not complete the survey. 




were anonymous, it is impossible to determine whether the ideological orientation of 
those who completed the study differed from those who did not. Furthermore, 
participants were not recruited but rather selected themselves into the study, although it 
is not immediately clear why ideology would be associated with willingness to 
participant in the current studies. A third possibility is that although the MTurk 
population might be relatively representative of the general population with respect to 
certain demographic variables, it could be that political ideology is not one of them. 
Regardless of the specific reason for this sampling bias, follow-up research should 
explore other possible sampling methods that strike a balance between both pragmatism 
and representativeness. 
Another limitation of these studies is that moral trade-offs were assessed via 
hypothetical scenarios. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the actors in 
the scenario instead of trying to solve an actual dilemma with real consequences. 
However, with some exceptions (e.g., Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
Strongman, 1999), hypothetical scenarios, such as the Defining Issues Test and the 
footbridge/trolley dilemmas, are used in the vast majority of research in moral 
psychology (Rest et al., 1974; Thompson, 1986). Furthermore, in the current studies, 
participants were not asked how they believed they would feel if they were to be faced 
with such a dilemma, but how the consideration of such a dilemma made them feel at 
that moment. A key aspect of sacred value trade-offs is that simply contemplating the 
trade-off is sufficient to induce strong negative affect (Tetlock et al, 2000). Thus, it 
seems plausible that ideological differences in at least negative affect, arousal, and 




should verify the generalizability of these results to actual moral behavior and 
judgment. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Together, these two studies address several important questions about the nature 
of the association between political ideology and moral decision-making. First, do self-
reported differences in the extent to which liberals and conservatives endorse binding 
foundations extend to complex and realistic moral dilemmas? Second, do binding 
foundations rise to the level of “sacred” values for conservatives but not for liberals? 
Finally, can reducing the motivation of conservatives to uphold binding or 
individualizing foundations alter their responses to cross-foundational moral trade-offs, 
including their actual decision preference? 
 The results of Study 1 suggest that the answers to the first two questions are 
”yes.” When participants were asked to make decisions between whether to uphold 
either individualizing or binding foundations, conservatives, unlike liberals, did not 
clearly prefer the individualizing foundations. Instead, they were reluctant to make a 
decision, signifying the relatively equal importance they place on both types of 
foundations. Furthermore, conservatives were more likely than liberals to experience 
heightened levels of negative affect, arousal, and decision difficulty while 
contemplating these dilemmas, which are characteristic of tragic trade-offs between two 
values an individual holds sacred. Nonetheless, attempts to reduce the motivation of 
conservatives to endorse either individualizing or binding foundations were not 




individualizing or binding foundations, their responses to cross-foundation moral trade-
offs remained unchanged. 
 The political process is highly intertwined with moral judgment and decision-
making. The policies and candidates people support are driven in part by congruency 
with the voters’ moral values on both the left and the right (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). 
Despite this commonality, the left and the right seem to be unable to agree on many 
pressing social and economic issues. MFT provides some insight into why these 
disagreements occur in that while everyone injects moral values into their political 
decision-making, conservatives include values that liberals do not moralize. The current 
studies extend MFT by demonstrating that these differences translate to psychological 
reactions to more complex and realistic moral dilemmas. Although no effects of moral 
credentialing or mediation between ideology and contemporary social issues were 
found, future research with revised measures or simplified dilemmas might be more 
successful in detecting any possible effects. 
 Conservatives experience greater levels of negative affect, arousal, and decision 
difficulty when contemplating individualizing versus binding trade-offs than do liberals. 
This presumably arises from a motivation to protect both types of values in such a 
trade-off, whereas liberals are motivated to protect only one type (i.e., individualizing 
values). Thus, the necessity of sacrificing one value to solve a dilemma should be 
perceived as threatening to conservatives and not to liberals. As the management of 
various threats is a major component of theories describing conservatism as motivated 
social cognition (Jost et al., 2003), future research should focus on examining any 




conservatives might have with either the generation or mollification of the threats 
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Appendix A: Reactions to Moral Trade-offs 
Negative Affect 
1. I feel glad about making this decision (reverse coded). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly  
Disagree 
  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I find having to make this decision to be frustrating. 
3. I feel good about making this decision (reverse coded). 
4. Having to make this decision is annoying. 
5. Making this decision puts me in a negative mood. 
Arousal 
1. I am very nervous about making the wrong decision. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly  
Disagree 
  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I feel excited about making this decision. 
3. I feel anxious about making the decision. 
4. It isn’t a big deal if I make the wrong decision (reverse coded). 
5. I find the possibility of making a wrong decision to be alarming. 
Decision Difficulty 
1. For me, this decision is...  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







2. I would need more time make a decision. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly  
Disagree 
  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. I would not ponder for a long time on this decision (reverse coded). 
4. I feel very ambivalent about this decision (reverse coded). 
5. For this decision, I feel certain which option to choose (reverse coded). 
Decision Preference 
 
What is your decision? 
 





















Appendix B: Demographics 
1. What is your age (in years)? 
2. What is your sex?   
  ___ Male   ___ Female 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
___ Black / African American ___ Native American 
___ White / Caucasian  ___ Asian / Pacific Islander 
___ Hispanic / Latino  ___ Middle Eastern 
___ Bi-cultural / Mixed  ___ Other 
4. If you answered other to the previous question, please indicate your ethnicity here. 
5. What is your relationship status? 
___ Single  ___ Married 
___ Widowed ___ Divorced / Separated 
6. Are you a U.S. citizen? 
___ Yes  ___ No 
7. If you are not a citizen, how long (in years) have you lived in the U.S.?  
8. What is your religious identification? 
___ Catholic ___ Protestant 
___ Mormon ___ Christian / Other 
___ Muslim ___ Jewish 
___ Hindu  ___ Buddhist 





9. If you answered other to the above question, please state your religious 
identification here. 
10. What is your approximate level of yearly income (please include only your own 
income and not any other members of your household)? 
___ $0 - $19,999  ___ $20,000 - $39,999 
___ $40,000 - $59,999 ___ $60,000 - $79,999 
___ $80,000 - $99,999 ___ $100,000 - $999,999 
___ over $1,000,000 
11. What is your highest level of education? 
___ Did not finish High School ___ High School / GED 
___ Associate’s Degree  ___ Bachelor’s Degree 
___ Graduate Degree 
12. To what extent do you identify as liberal versus conservative? 















       
13. To what extent do you identify with either the Democratic or the Republican Party? 
 













14. To what extent do you agree with economic conservative policies (economic 
conservatism means a belief in less government spending on social programs, lower 
taxes, deregulation of the economy, free trade, etc.)? 
 
















       
15. To what extent do you agree with cultural conservative policies (cultural 
conservatism means a belief that the government should encourage or enforce 
traditional cultural and moral values, such as supporting traditional marriage, and 
prohibiting drugs, pornography, euthanasia, etc.)? 


















Appendix C: Contemporary Social Issues 
Now we would like to ask you about your attitudes and opinions toward various social  
issues. Please answer as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. 
1. Same-sex couples (i.e., two men or two women) should be allowed to marry. 














2. The United States was completely justified in invading Iraq. 
3. Abortion should be made illegal in the United States. 
4. The United States should have health care reform that includes a public option, 





Appendix D: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO) 
RWA 
This short survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a 
variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the 
statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to 
each statement with the provided scale. 
You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a 
statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (-4) with one idea in a 
statement, but slightly agree (+ 1) with another idea in the same item. When this 
happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel "on balance" 
(i.e., a -3 in this case). 
1. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else (reverse coded). 




















2. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
3. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
SDO 
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling 
towards? For each of the following objects or statements, select a response below each 




1. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at 
the bottom. 














2. Group equality should be our ideal (reverse coded). 







Appendix E: Moral Trade-off Scenarios 
General Directions 
You will now be asked to respond to several social dilemmas. Imagine that you are in 
the position described by each scenario. For each scenario, you will have two possible 
options to resolve the dilemma. After reading the scenario and your options, you will 
first be asked several questions regarding how you feel about the dilemma. After 
answering these questions, you will then be asked to choose which option you 
prefer.  Please answer as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and 
we are only interested in your thoughts and feelings about these dilemmas. When you 
are ready, please click ">>" to begin. 
Individualizing versus Individualizing Trade-offs 
1. You are the director of health care management at a large hospital. Not only is it 
your job to ensure that the hospital’s finances are in order, but you also are required 
to occasionally make difficult decisions regarding the allocation of care to patients. 
One day, you are asked to make a decision regarding the allocation of a donated 
liver for a transplant operation. One of the patients is a five-year-old boy, who has a 
hereditary liver disease. The other patient is an equally sick six-year-old boy with 
severe liver damage due to an infection. Both children have been on the waiting list 
for some time, but because of the shortage of local organ donors, only one liver is 
available. You will only be able to save the life of one child. The other one will 
almost certainly not survive. Who should receive the donor liver? 
1)      The five-year-old boy 




2. You are the human resources manager for a large accounting firm. The firm is 
currently looking for a new certified public accountant (CPA), and you have already 
interviewed several applicants for the position. There are four applicants vying for 
the position, and you discover that one of the applicants is currently unemployed 
and struggling to take care of his family of four. Additionally, his unemployment 
benefits are about to expire. However, one of the other applicants has slightly better 
credentials and more experience than the unemployed applicant does. You are 
concerned about the welfare of the unemployed applicant and his family if you 
don’t hire him, but you also feel like you might be cheating the other applicants out 
of a job that he was legitimately qualified for, and perhaps even more qualified for. 
What should you do? 
1)      Hire the unemployed applicant. 
2)      Hire the applicant with the better qualifications. 
3. You are the supervisor overseeing the construction of a large office building 
designed by a famous post-modern architect. Because of the building’s design, one 
area of the construction site is particularly dangerous, and there is a high potential 
for injury. Because no one volunteered to be assigned to this area, you decided to 
have all of your employees draw straws to determine their assignments. However, 
the employee who drew the assignment for the dangerous area has a reputation for 
being a very skilled carpenter, but also somewhat clumsy. If he were to work in this 
area, you feel that there would be a high probability that he would be injured, but 
you also feel that redrawing the straws would be giving the clumsy employee 





1)      Keep the assignments as they are. 
2)      Redraw the straws. 
Individualizing versus Binding Trade-offs 
1. You are in charge of admitting new members into an exclusive club at your 
university. Being a member of this club carries with it several benefits, such as 
increased scholarship opportunities and an increased likelihood of getting into 
graduate school. This club has very strict requirements for membership, and it is 
your job to screen out applicants who don’t qualify. For example, applicants must 
have a high GPA and must have participated in a variety of extracurricular activities 
in high school. One day you come across an otherwise strong applicant who is just 
lacking in extracurriculars. You notice that the applicant’s high school is located in 
a poor rural community, and you surmise that the reason the applicant doesn’t have 
many extracurriculars is that his school probably did not offer them. You feel that it 
wouldn’t be fair to deny him membership because of the school he went to, but you 
also feel that it is your duty to respect the rules and values of your club. What 
should you do? 
1)      Admit the applicant (Individualizing).  
2)      Deny the applicant (Binding).  
2. You are the human resources manager for a large accounting firm. The firm is 
currently looking for a new certified public accountant (CPA), and you have already 
interviewed several applicants for the position. There are four applicants vying for 




know from various church activities. However, one of the other applicants has 
slightly better credentials and a little more experience than your fellow church 
member does. You want to hire the candidate who belongs to your church, as you 
know he shares your values and beliefs and almost feels like “family,” but you also 
feel that you might be cheating the other applicant out of a job that he was 
legitimately qualified for, and perhaps even more qualified for. What should you 
do? 
1)      Hire the applicant who is a member of your church (Binding). 
2)      Hire the applicant with the slightly better qualifications (Individualizing). 
3. You are an army soldier currently on a tour in an active combat zone. While on a 
mission, your commanding officer reports to the platoon that he has received 
intelligence that important enemy operatives are hiding in a nearby building. It 
would be your job as an artillery specialist to volley rockets into the building to 
draw the enemy out. As your team approaches the site, you become certain that the 
intelligence was wrong, and the building in question is actually a school that is still 
in use. Even with this knowledge, your commanding officer gives you an order to 
commence firing on the building so that the other troops can advance. You feel it is 
your duty as a soldier to always obey your commanding officer no matter what, but 
you also believe that if you did, you would only be killing civilians. What should 
you do?  
1)      Fire on the building (your commanding officer will take full responsibility 




2)      Refuse to fire on the building (you can explain to your commanding 
officer why) (Individualizing). 
Binding versus Binding Trade-offs 
1. Shortly after leaving your home for the first time to attend college, you begin to be 
unhappy with the direction your life is going. After hearing about several recent 
terrorist attacks in the Middle East in the news, you decide that nothing would be 
more meaningful than serving and protecting your country and that you should join 
the military. Unfortunately, both your parents are very anti-war, and when they find 
out, they forbid you from joining the military. Furthermore, they warn that if you do 
join, you would no longer be welcome in their home. You feel that you should 
respect your parents’ wishes; they are your family, after all, but you also feel that it 
is your duty as a citizen to loyally serve your country. What should you do? 
1)      Don’t join the military.  
2)      Join the military.  
2. You are the human resources manager for a large accounting firm. The firm is 
currently looking for a new certified public accountant (CPA), and you have already 
interviewed several applicants for the position. There are four applicants vying for 
the position, and one of them happens to have been a member of your church whom 
you know from various church activities. However, the accounting firm’s Board of 
Directors, who are your bosses, asks you to consider one of the other candidates that 
they prefer. You feel like you should hire the candidate who belongs to the same 




“family,” but you also feel that you should respect the preferences of your bosses as 
a loyal employee. What should you do? 
1)      Hire the applicant who is a member of your church. 
2)      Hire the applicant preferred by the Board. 
3. You are a graduate student at a respectable research university. Your professor is 
very strict regarding the division of duties amongst his students and general 
procedures in the laboratory. For example, he requires his students to be in the lab 
for a specific number of hours each week and requires careful logging of all lab 
activities. Lately you have noticed that your colleague, who is also a close friend of 
yours, has been somewhat shirking his responsibilities. He has been leaving lab 
early the past couple of days and does not record activities he considers trivial. You 
have also heard him remark that your professor is “an old geezer,” and he shouldn’t 
have to follow his arbitrary rules. Although it is not affecting the work of anyone 
else, you feel your professor should be informed that your colleague is undermining 
his authority, but you also feel you should be loyal to colleague and friend and not 
tattle on him. What should you do?   
1)      Inform your professor. 









Appendix F: Pilot Study 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 65 individuals recruited using Mturk. Participation in this 
study was restricted to those with an IP address from within the United States. Twenty-
seven participants were excluded from the analysis for either providing only partial data 
or for completing the entire study in less than five minutes. Of the remaining 
participants, fifteen were male (21 female, 2 did not report) with an average age of 37. 8 
years (SD = 14.1; Min = 18; Max = 68). The majority of participants identified 
themselves as White (76.3%). The remaining participants identified as Black (7.9%), 
Asian, Hispanic, or Mixed ethnicity (5.3% each). Participants were predominantly 
Christian (63.2%) or Atheist / Agnostic (26.3%). A high school diploma / GED was the 
highest educational achievement for the majority of participants (60.5%). The 
remaining participants had either an undergraduate degree (36.9%) or a graduate degree 
(2.6%). Participants were compensated either $.10 or $.25 for their participation in this 
study. 
Procedure 
 After following the link posted on Mturk to the survey and providing consent to 
participate, participants reviewed all nine of the moral trade-offs listed in Appendix E. 
After each trade-off, participants were asked to indicate whether each option 
represented a preference for individualizing or binding foundations. Specifically, 
participants were asked, “Would choosing option 1 (2) mean a preference for protecting 




issues?’’ (individualizing foundations) and, “Would choosing option 1 (2) mean a 
preference for social order, fulfilling duties, and protecting your group or society (e.g., 
respecting authority, loyalty, remaining pure, etc.) over other issues?” (binding 
foundations). Participants then completed a measure of demographics and were 
debriefed in the same manner as in Study 1. 
Results 
Individualizing Versus Binding Trade-offs 
 In order to determine whether each option represented the appropriate 
foundations (e.g., individualizing or binding foundations), responses for items asking if 
the option indicates a preference for individualizing foundations were compared to 
those asking if the option indicates a preference for binding foundations using paired 
sample t-tests. For scenario 1 (admitting new members into an exclusive club), option 1 
(admitting the applicant) was rated as significantly more indicative of individualizing 
(M = 5.50; SD = 1.39) than binding foundations (M = 3.34; SD = 1.86), t(37) = 5.76, p 
< .001, d = 1.32. Likewise, option 2 (denying the applicant), was significantly more 
indicative of binding (M = 4.74; SD = 1.96) than individualizing foundations (M = 
2.76; SD = 1.57), t(37) = –5.66, p < .001, d = 1.12. 
 For scenario 2 (hiring decision), option 1 (hiring the church member) was 
significantly more indicative binding (M = 3.57; SD = 1.94) than individualizing 
foundations (M = 2.35; SD = 1.23), t(36) = –3.53, p = .001, d = 0.75. Although not 
significant, option 2 (hiring the better qualified applicant) was more indicative of 
individualizing (M = 5.39; SD = 1.76) than binding foundations (M = 4.95; SD = 1.82), 




 For scenario 3 (soldier in a combat zone), option 1 (firing on the building) was 
significantly more indicative of binding (M = 5.03; SD = 2.12) than individualizing 
foundations (M = 1.87; SD = 1.53), t(37) = –7.35, p < .001, d = 1.71. Option 2 (refusing 
the order), was significantly more indicative of individualizing (M = 5.89; SD = 1.67) 
than binding foundations (M = 3.84; SD = 2.13), t(37) = 4.83, p < .001, d = 1.07. In 
summary, five of the six options significantly indicated a preference for the target 
foundation. The remaining option, although not significant, was in the correct direction. 
Individualizing Versus Individualizing Trade-offs 
 For scenario 1 (hospital), option 1 (saving the five-year-old boy) did not 
significantly differ in ratings of individualizing (M = 3.42; SD = 1.94) and binding 
foundations (M = 3.58; SD = 1.84), t(37) < 1, ns. Option 2 (saving the six-year-old boy) 
was slightly more indicative of individualizing (M = 3.97; SD = 2.03) than binding (M 
= 3.55; SD = 1.84) foundations, although this difference was not significant, t(37) = 
1.46, p = .15. 
 For scenario 2 (hiring decision), option 1 (hiring the unemployed applicant) was 
more indicative of individualizing (M = 3.46; SD = 1.61) than binding foundations (M 
= 2.89; SD = 1.70), a difference that approached significance, t(36) = 1.71, p = .10, d = 
.34. Option 2 (hiring the more qualified applicant) did not differ in ratings of 
individualizing (M = 4.80; SD = 1.68) and binding foundations (M = 5.03; SD = 1.71), 
t(34) < 1, ns. 
 For scenario 3 (construction supervisor), option 1 (keeping the assignments) did 
not differ in ratings of individualizing (M = 3.89; SD = 1.78) and binding foundations 




however, was more indicative of individualizing (M = 4.21; SD = 1.98) than binding 
foundations (M = 3.63; SD = 1.79), a difference that approached significance, t(37) = 
1.88, p = .07, d = .31. In summary, only two of the six options indicated a preference for 
the target foundations that approached statistical significance. The other four options 
did not statistically differ in preference towards individualizing or binding foundations. 
Binding Versus Binding Foundations 
 For scenario 1 (joining the military against parental wishes), option 1 (not 
joining the military) was more indicative of binding (M = 4.24; SD = 2.14) than 
individualizing (M = 3.53; SD = 2.12) foundations, a difference that approached 
significance, t(37) = –1.91, p = .06, d = .33. Option 2 (joining the military) was actually 
significantly more indicative of individualizing (M = 4.71; SD = 1.86) than binding 
foundations (M = 4.21; SD = 1.88), t(37) = 2.08, p = .05, d = .27. 
 For scenario 2 (hiring decision), option 1 (hiring the church member) did not 
differ between binding (M = 3.30; SD = 2.08) and individualizing foundations (M = 
2.97; SD = 1.86), t(36) < 1, ns. Option 2 (hiring the applicant preferred by the Board) 
was significantly more indicative of binding (M = 5.24; SD = 1.71) than individualizing 
foundations (M = 3.95; SD = 1.83), t(36) = –4.48, p < .001, d = .73. 
 For scenario 3 (graduate student), option 1 (informing the professor) was more 
indicative of binding (M = 4.74; SD = 1.74) than individualizing foundations (M = 
4.00; SD = 1.80), t(37) = –2.69, p = .01, d = .42. Option 2 (keeping silent), however, 
was more indicative of individualizing (M = 3.95; SD = 1.95) than binding foundations 
(M = 3.32; SD = 1.91), t(37) = 2.02, p = .05, d = .33. In summary, three of the six 




additional option did suggest a preference for binding foundations, but this difference 
was not significant. The remaining two options, contrary to predictions, indicated a 





Appendix G: Moral Credentialing Manipulation  
Directions for Experimental Conditions 
Imagine that you are offered $100 (anonymously and secretly) to perform the following 
behaviors. For each action, assume that nothing bad would happen to you afterwards. 
Also assume that you cannot use the money to make up for your action. Please rate the 
likelihood that you would be willing to engage in the behaviors. 
Directions for Control Conditions 
For each of the following phrases, please identify each word that can be classified as a 
noun and each word that can be classified as a verb. Please type your answers in the 
space below each item. 
Items for Individualizing Foundations 
1. Kick a dog in the head, hard. 









Likely Very Likely 
       
 
2. Make cruel remarks to an overweight person about his or her appearance. 
3. Stick a pin into the palm of a child you don’t know. 
4. Cheat in a game of cards played for money with some people you don’t know 
well. 
5. Steal from a poor person and use the money to buy a gift for a rich person. 








1. Break off all communications with your immediate and extended family for 1 
year. 
2. Burn your country’s flag. 
3. Curse your parents to their face. 
4. Make a disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor. 
5. Cook and eat your dog, after it dies of natural causes. 
6. Attend a performance art piece in which all participants (including you) have to 
act like animals for 30 minutes, including crawling around naked and urinating 
on the floor. 
 
